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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a response to Bennett's (1977) 
call for a theoretical framework capable of integrating 
existing theories of mass belief systems. The theory 
offered here is built on two important discoveries in this 
body of research: the importance of simplifying heuristics 
and the hierarchical structure of belief systems. 
Recognizing that heuristics are described in a narrative 
form, the general importance of narrative for political 
cognition is suggested and explored. Of particular 
importance is the possibility that hierarchical belief 
systems are grounded in core narratives or myths. After 
demonstrating the theoretical links between myth and belief 
system, a way of conceptualizing a narrative view of 
political cognition is developed. This step in the 
dissertation argues that the political belief system is 
best conceived of as a self-organized system, and that 
narrative functions as a form/process which provides the 
organizing principle for the system. Next the relationship 
between this and previous theories of belief systems is 
explored. Finally, interviews with a small number of 
respondents are examined for indications of the existence 
and function of myths and other narratives within political 
beliefs.
iv
INTRODUCTION
In order to be clear on the object of study, the first 
task is to give some indication of the location of this 
dissertation within the discipline of political science.
The line of inquiry to which it attempts to add is usually 
labeled public opinion research. Like most previous public 
opinion research, the dissertation will examine popular as 
opposed to elite "behavior." This means the focus will not 
be any specific governmental institution, but society at 
large. Furthermore, as implied by the label for this type 
of research, the phenomena under consideration relates to 
the opinions rather than the actions of this public.
A subset of the public opinion literature looks for an 
organizational framework for these attitudes. In other 
words, the political scientist looks for some internal 
coherence to opinions on various issues. A coherent set of 
beliefs is referred to as a belief system. According to 
Converse, a belief system is "a configuration of ideas and 
attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some 
form of constraint or functional interdependence" (1964, 
207). The ideas and attitudes which are most often 
examined are political opinions, usually policy opinions. 
The theoretical work in this research boils down to an 
effort to explain the constraint or functional 
interdependence. As will be introduced presently and
1
2discussed in detail in succeeding chapters, several 
explanations have been proposed.
It is the primary contention of this dissertation that 
the coherence of the belief systems of most individuals is 
grounded in a myth of human social interactions. Before 
proceeding any further, however, it is important to clarify 
what is meant by the term myth. The term is not often used 
in political science, and when it is, it usually indicates 
a lie, some sort of falsehood perpetrated to achieve 
political ends. In anthropology, however, myth is seen as 
something quite different. In the context of the ensuing 
discussion of political belief systems, the term myth 
refers to foundational narratives which describe the nature 
of social relationships and the individual's place within 
those relationships. More generally, narrative or story 
indicates any cognitive vignette portraying characters and 
their actions.
The need for fundamental theoretical work on belief 
systems is evident in the fragmented nature of past 
research. The approach of Converse (e.g. 1964) and many 
others has been to begin with the assumption that 
individuals are socialized into a particular belief system. 
Thus it was logical for these investigators to speak of a 
"mass belief system" believing as they did that most 
citizens would be socialized into one of a very small 
number (usually two) of existing belief systems. Partially
3as a consequence of Converse's own findings, this body of 
research has fractured into several lines of inquiry. Some 
of these maintain the search for sociological origins of 
belief systems and political opinions generally. Others 
have abandoned this tack of investigation and have focussed 
on individual psychological characteristics: emotional 
attachments to social groups, internal cognitive 
structures, etc. Until very recently, most of these 
approaches existed as independent research projects, 
offering meaningful, but speaking theoretically or 
empirically, only partial explanations of the phenomena 
(Bennett 1977) .
The first major step in presenting the dissertation 
will be a critical review of this literature. Analysis of 
the various approaches indicates that all of them display 
both strengths and weaknesses. None of them is definitive, 
but neither can any be completely rejected. Furthermore, 
in order to develop as clear a picture as possible of what 
is known, the public opinion literature considered in this 
dissertation will not be limited to research explicitly 
exploring systems of political belief. In an effort to 
achieve clarity of analysis, much investigation of people's 
political opinions examines only a single opinion or set of 
similar opinions. These projects are fruitful sources of 
theory and discovery, and their results easily applied to 
belief systems as a whole. The discussion of such research
4presented herein will spell out exactly what is being
explained, and how the ideas and findings are important to
the study of belief systems.
The key to broadening an understanding of belief
systems is the integration of previous theories. Bennett
(1977) describes the belief system literature as being
replete with anomalies in the Kuhnian sense. He suggests
that there are several possible outcomes to this situation,
the most desirable of which is
possible if a general, integrative, theory of 
mass beliefs could be constructed through the 
systematic identification and evaluation of the 
epistemological assumptions underlying disputed 
concepts and findings. The major advantage of 
this outcome would be the production of a 
systematically articulated theory, the 
assumptions of which were well documented as a 
result of the process of integrating divergent 
viewpoints (473).
This is the target at which the present dissertation is
aimed.
Movement toward this mark requires development of a
theory and then demonstration of its integrative
capability. The theory of political belief to be proposed
in this dissertation is derived from previous research. It
begins with what I believe to be a paradigmatic example of
policy reasoning. This example is the desert heuristic as
set forth by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991).
According to these researchers:
A perception that some person or group is in need 
gives rise to a search for causation (why does 
the need exist?). In turn, the causal
conclusions that people reach have important 
implications for their reactions to the needy 
individual or group...Did the need arise as a 
result of some internal characteristic of the 
actor or some aspect of the external environment?
(72)
Answers to such questions lead to emotional responses to 
the situation which, in turn, imply conclusions about the
proper response which the government should take (72-73) .
The first step in moving beyond this description of 
policy evaluation is to name its general form; I have
chosen the name narrative due to its integration of
characters and plot. The majority of this dissertation is 
concerned with exploring and evaluating the implications of 
applying the name narrative to this general form of 
political reasoning.
Chapter two begins by combining this observation with 
the fairly well supported proposition that belief systems 
are hierarchical in structure. This leads to speculation 
about the importance of core narratives. And the social 
science concept most similar to an idea of core narrative 
is myth. The first challenge in making the case that 
political beliefs are grounded in myths is demonstrating 
that myth is theoretically relevant to belief system. 
Chapter two will present the theoretical argument for the 
compatibility of the concepts myth and belief system. The 
importance of myths to people's lives generally and the 
extensive co-incidence between the nature and function of 
myth and the qualities of belief system in need of
explanation are justifications for further analysis of this 
relationship.
This focus on myths and narratives will bring to light 
one fundamental, epistemological weakness in nearly all of 
the belief system literature, namely the physicality of its 
description of political cognition. Following in a 
Newtonian scientific tradition, exploration of belief 
systems has incorporated such concepts as ideological 
"yardsticks", schematic "scaffolding" and "causal chains of 
reasoning." As it will be described at the end of chapter 
two, though, a myth based belief system would be a much 
less structured affair. However, even in the natural 
world, systems have been discovered whose dynamics are far 
more complex than the simple, linear systems described by 
Newton. These systems have been described as "self- 
organized systems" (Scott, 1989).
Chapter three will begin with a discussion of self­
organized systems and present evidence that the political 
belief system is a good example of them. The subsequent 
discussion will demonstrate that viewing belief systems as 
self-organized gives further credence to the suggestion 
that myths, and narratives more generally, are fundamental 
aspects of political thinking. This reconceptualization, 
however, shifts the focus of investigative effort. There 
is reason to be circumspect in making predictions about 
changes in self-organized belief systems; attention should
be directed towards an organizational process. Stated 
succinctly, the conclusion from this discussion is that the 
individual belief system is best understood as being 
neither linked by causal/logic chains of reasoning, nor as 
purely random, but rather as exhibiting an order centered 
on evolving narratives and related processes. At the 
collective level, myths, those important narratives shared 
by peoples with common experiences, are the common threads 
connecting the mass belief system.
Having developed a theory of myth based belief 
systems, the next chapter of the dissertation will proceed 
along lines suggested by Bennett (1977). That is, it will 
attempt to demonstrate that this theory integrates other 
explanations of belief systems. This step requires a 
careful reconsideration of the arguments and the empirical 
findings of the earlier studies. To the extent that this 
theory is an integration of others, it must capture the 
strengths and avoid the theoretical limitations of research 
grounded in ideology, core values, schema, etc.
The final substantive chapter of this dissertation 
will consist of a brief glimpse of the real world as it is 
illuminated by the theory of myth based belief systems.
More specifically, I will collect and analyze data on the 
political beliefs of a small number of college students.
Of interest will be the presence of narratives in their 
policy reasoning, shared core narratives, and rational
coherence of the whole system despite superficial 
differences between respondents in policy opinions.
These, then, are the issues which will be discussed in 
this dissertation: that cognition in the belief system is 
self-organized, consequently it is more meaningful to speak 
of an organizing process rather than a fixed organizational 
structure; at the individual level there is reason to 
believe that narrative is an important element of this 
process; and that myths are shared narratives which play a 
powerful role in the integration of individual belief 
systems and form the foundation for mass belief systems.
Though these points are important additions to the 
study of political cognition, this project will raise many 
more questions than it answers. An entirely new approach 
to the study of the phenomena is in fact being suggested; 
an approach which will have only rudimentary beginnings 
here. Nevertheless, these ideas do offer answers to some 
of the persistent questions which have plagued this sub­
field: Why does a separate belief system continue to exist 
for black Americans? Why is ideology only relevant to 
elite belief systems? How do political culture and schema 
relate to change? How do religious beliefs interact with 
political belief systems? Answers to such questions will 
be discussed when they are reconsidered from the vantage 
point of a theory of myth based belief systems. A few 
interesting questions raised by the dissertation, as well
9as suggestions for future exploration, will be included in 
the conclusion.
CHAPTER I 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature to be presented here has been reviewed 
and critiqued many times. Most recently Sniderman, Brody, 
and Tetlock (1991) have provided an excellent, general 
summary of much of it. The present analysis of the 
research on belief systems has a very specific goal, 
however. The intent here is to establish a foundation on 
which an integrated theory might be built. This requires a 
demonstration that the various theoretical approaches to 
the topic are not mutually exclusive; that there are points 
of overlap between the concepts of ideology, core values, 
social groups, etc. The primary purpose of this literature 
review, therefore, is to make explicit these points of 
common ground. Doing so should produce a clearer picture 
of the elements which must be included in an integrated 
theory.
This review will proceed by examination of major, 
representative pieces within each of the major theoretical 
frameworks. First to be considered will be the 
sociological explanations: ideology and political culture. 
The latter research does not normally directly treat the 
belief system phenomena. Nevertheless, it has important 
implications for understanding policy reasoning.
Discussion of the more individual oriented, psychological 
approaches will follow. Included here will be
10
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presentations of the following concepts: core values, 
social group identity, attribution theory, and schemas.
In 1964, Converse set the tone and the parameters for much 
of the debate on the relationship between ideology and 
belief systems which was to follow. In this article, he 
lays out a theoretical framework depicting the ideological 
belief system, and then demonstrates empirically that this 
depiction does not describe the political beliefs of the 
vast majority of Americans. The theoretical and the 
empirical elements of Converse's work have both been 
foundations for subsequent research; consequently, both 
must be considered in some detail.
One important aspect of Converse's theory of belief 
systems is his definition of the concept. Quoted above, it 
has remained the standard expression of the phenomena 
regardless of the theoretical approach to its study. 
Converse also lays out the classic statement of the 
theoretical link between the individual belief system, 
which he has defined, and the concept of mass belief 
system. According to Converse, "a minuscule proportion of 
any population" performs the necessary "act of creative 
synthesis," linking various ideas together "into apparently 
logical wholes that are credible to large numbers of 
people" (211). These artificial "packages" are referred to 
as ideologies. The next step required in the construction
12
of a mass belief system is the distribution of these 
packages to the masses. These super-elites present the 
ideas and their logical constraint to others through such 
rhetorical forms as "'if you believe this, then you will 
also believe that, for it follows in such and such ways'" 
(211). As the masses accept these arguments, political 
thinking within a nation becomes coherent. Incoherence in 
the structure of collective opinion results from the 
failure to communicate ideas and logic (212-14).
A third element of Converse's theory which has been 
very important in the belief system literature is the 
suggestion that in the case of contemporary Western 
politics, the functioning ideology is the liberal- 
conservative continuum (214) . The argument that this 
continuum should be the ideological source of belief system 
constraint is grounded in its prevalence among political 
elites of all types, and its rational efficiency or 
"economy" (214-15). Though Converse recognizes that "the 
liberal-conservative continuum is a rather elegant, high- 
order abstraction, and [that] such abstractions are not 
typical conceptual tools for the 'man on the street,'" he 
nevertheless maintains it as the primary lens through which 
he examines belief systems.
Empirically, Converse begins with analysis of a set of 
open ended questions. From this data he establishes a 
taxonomy referred to as levels of conceptualization. The
13
five levels range from those who seem to use and understand 
ideological labels in their policy opinions to those who 
have few or no policy opinions at all. Converse finds that 
these levels are closely related to education and political 
information. Further empirical analysis confirms that this 
stratification of the respondents captures important 
differences between people's belief systems. Correlations 
between pairs of opinions indicate that elite thinking is 
more constrained than non-elites (227-31). Also, 
longitudinal analysis reveals greater temporal stability in 
the opinions of elites (238-45).
One further empirical finding in this research is 
worth noting at this point. For roughly half of the survey 
respondents, by far the largest single level, social groups 
are an essential element in its policy opinions. As will 
be discussed below, this finding is the inspiration for 
another line of inquiry into the structure of public 
opinion.
Converse concludes that the American electorate is not 
ideologically constrained, but is comprised of a collection 
of disparate "issue publics." These issue publics differ 
in the policies which interest them: "different 
controversies excite different people to the point of real 
opinion formation" (246). "A realistic picture of 
political belief systems in the mass public, then, is not 
one that omits issues and policy demands completely nor one
14
that presumes widespread ideological coherence; it is 
rather one that captures with some fidelity the 
fragmentation, narrowness, and diversity of these demands" 
(247). Converse expresses a belief that no theoretical 
explanation of this picture, which would be both powerful 
and parsimonious, is possible.
At about the time Converse's comments on the 
disorganization of public opinion were being published, an 
increase in organization was apparently taking place. Nie 
and Anderson (1974) find that between 1960 and 1964 there 
was a dramatic increase in the ideological consistency of 
the American population. Following Converse, they measure 
ideological consistency as correlations between pairs of 
issue positions. As an explanation of the changes, Nie and 
Anderson suggest that politics had become more salient in 
people's lives: "we argue that the political events of the 
last decade [the 1960s] and the crisis atmosphere which has 
attended them, have caused citizens to perceive politics as 
increasingly central to their lives" (571). Consequently, 
they propose, people are under increasing psychological 
pressure to purge the "inconsistencies" from their 
reasoning. Or, in language Converse might have used, the 
number of issue publics collapses around the ideological 
reasoning of elites because people are paying more 
attention to information from this source. Measuring 
salience with an inquiry into attention the respondent pays
15
to elections, Nie and Anderson do find a relationship
between this factor and ideological consistency (571-574) .
An alternative explanation for the post 1960 increase
in ideological consistency is proffered by Carmines and
Stimson (1982). Converse observed that there were
variations in the centrality of issues within a belief
system (19 64, 2 08). Carmines and Stimson suggest that
beginning in the early 1960s,
as the symbolic, emotionally charged issues of 
race took on a clear partisan complexion, they 
simultaneously moved to the center of the 
political belief systems. In other words the 
partisan evolution of race lead to an increase in 
ideological constraint as mass responses to 
racial issues became aligned with attitudes 
toward other political issues (6).
That is, the number of issue publics collapsed not because
politics in general became more salient but because they
found a common center, a center on which there was
increasingly clear elite leadership.
Factor analysis of issue positions controlling for
race provides empirical evidence that racial concerns
became central to the consistency of belief systems of
those of higher cognitive ability (Carmines and Stimson
1982, 9-17). In order to explain this rather rapid change,
however, Carmines and Stimson must alter Converse's (1964)
sociological explanation of attitude consistency. They
argue that the public opinion elites who supply structure
to public belief systems are specific candidates for
elected office at a given time. Thus belief systems are
16
not learned over the course of a lifetime, but during those 
brief periods when politics brings itself to the forefront 
of people's awareness (Carmines and Stimson 1982, 19-20).
It is important to note that the Carmines and Stimson 
and the Nie and Anderson explanations of increase in 
attitude constraint are not mutually exclusive. The rise 
of racial questions in public policy discourse could have 
been responsible for the increasing salience of politics.
It is also important to note that in these and many other 
investigations, there remains a large segment of the 
population for whom no attitude consistency is evident.
There may, however, be problems with the initial 
discovery on which these two studies are based, that 
ideological consistency increased in the early 1960s. 
Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1978) examine changes in 
National Election Study (NES) question wording over this 
time period. Testing two question formats on two samples 
of the same population at the same time, these 
investigators find differences in magnitude of ideological 
consistency between the two samples comparable to those 
discussed above (see also Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 
1978) .
Other researchers have called into question 
theoretical aspects of the ideological approach to the 
study of belief systems. Achen (1975) questions the 
validity of the response categories. Specifically he
17
suggests that Converse and others have put too much stock 
in the qualifier "strongly." His evidence demonstrates 
that interpretations of this term are time bound and random 
even for elites. This discovery brings into question 
Converse's finding that elite attitudes are more stable 
than those of non-elites.
In a more recent study, Fleishman (1986) finds no 
support for the salience hypothesis. Despite an 
increasingly conservative leadership, there is no 
corresponding increase in the ideology of the masses. He 
finds a decline, in fact, in the number of people who 
identify themselves as liberal or conservative (536-37).
Responding to these latter findings, subsequent 
research has suggested other variations on the Converse 
theme. Lilie (1986) has suggested a more complex, two 
dimensional ideological structure to public opinion. 
Wittkopf (1986, 1987) and Holsti and Rosenau (1988) have 
discovered evidence of a similar structure for opinions on 
foreign policy issues. Still others have demonstrated 
that, for many, the ideological labels are symbolic terms 
with little or no issue content (Levitin and Miller 1979; 
Conover and Feldman 1981).
This line of inquiry has brought us to a point at 
which "we know more about how people do not think about 
politics than about how they do" (Feldman 1988, 416). This 
circumstance is partially a result of theoretical
18
limitations in Converse's notions of ideological belief
systems. According to Converse, the absence of ideological
uniformity is a product of breakdown in the dissemination
of information from elites to masses. By contrast, other
commentators on ideology point out that variations in
historical (e.g., Halpern 1961), material (e.g. Lasswell
and Kaplan 1950), and other factors may contribute to
variations in ideology. If these latter are more accurate,
we should expect a great deal of ideological pluralism in
the United States.
Adding credence to the suggestion that we should
expect to find ideological variations within the American
population is Grafstein's (1990) argument that different
ideologies may be equally rational. Grafstein suggests
that what appear to us as irrational belief systems may in
fact be perfectly rational conclusions derived from
different premisses or "conceptual schemes:"
given the existence of differing conceptual 
schemes, there is no reason to assume that fully 
rational individuals-with rationality defined our 
way-wili converge to the same beliefs once they 
are presented with a lot of information or 
evidence. Chances are, there will always be the 
potential for divergent conclusions (13).
This in fact is consistent with Converse's own recognition
that the liberal-conservative continuum is an artificial
construct and is only one way to rationally constrain
public issues.
19
This is an important point for the social scientist 
who studies belief systems to keep in mind when 
interpreting survey data. The fact that rational belief 
systems do not appear to the researcher is not conclusive 
evidence that rational belief systems do not exist. For 
example, correlations between pairs of issue positions, or 
groups of issue positions through factor analysis, are 
tests of the degree to which groups of people think like 
each other. Nothing can be concluded from such tests about 
the rational coherence of any individual's belief system 
(Brown 197 0).
Despite these theoretical and empirical limitations on 
the search for ideologically constrained belief systems, 
two important discoveries have survived scrutiny. First 
there is a substantial portion of the population which has 
almost no opinions on contemporary political issues. We 
must recognize, then, that any discussion of mass belief 
systems excludes this group. Second, opinions of elites do 
seem to be somewhat constrained along the liberal- 
conservative continuum. Thus this measuring stick has some 
significance and must be included in any attempt to develop 
a more complete explanation. Even for the most politically 
astute segment of the population, however, correlations 
between pairs of issues never approach unity; there remains 
a great deal of unexplained variance in their belief 
systems.
20
A somewhat more abstract approach to the study of the 
sociological origins of public opinion is taken by those 
who employ the concept of political culture. Devine (1972) 
provides an excellent treatment of the traditional 
understanding of political culture. At its core, Devine 
argues, a political culture is a value system. Though it 
is not universal, it is the value system held by the 
majority of the members of a political system. This value 
system is historical, i.e. transferred from generation to 
generation, and is comprised of four sub-systems: identity, 
which is psychological attachment to the political system 
as a whole and its members; rules, which are political 
norms of action, a constitution; symbols or artifacts; and 
beliefs, which are "the fundamental principles and goals 
supported by the members of the political system" (16-18, 
quote on 18).
For the individual, a political culture performs 
several functions. It provides a mental map of the 
external world. In turn this map influences perception of 
that world. Social behavior, the interaction of the 
individual with the world, is consequently shaped by 
political culture. In this way, the culture value system 
tends to maintain itself across generations, and thereby, 
becomes an important aspect of the maintenance of social 
and psychological order (7-14) . The change that does occur
21
does so through the environmental feedback loop of 
traditional systems theory (18-32).
Thus where Converse identifies two important 
ideologies at work in the American political system, Devine 
is interested in a single political culture. And in fact 
he identifies Lockean liberalism, particularly as described 
by Hartz, as that political culture (47-65) . But Devine 
does not claim that liberalism is the fundamental value 
system of all Americans, only most of them. Therefore, it 
may explain general tendencies and regime stability. He 
leaves unanswered, however, the question of cultural 
variation and its importance. Consequently, the 
relationship between uniformity and variation in culture 
and uniformity and variation in ideology is not explained. 
Another difference between ideology and culture is that the 
former focuses on rational coherence and the latter on 
values. Is it necessary to choose one over the other in 
explaining systems of political belief?
Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky (1990) provide a theory 
of culture which indicates that this is not necessary.
Their theory integrates dualisms such as fact-value and 
stability-change. "Rather than counterpoising rationality 
and irrationality, we refer to competing social definitions 
of what will count as rational. No act can be classified 
as in and of itself rational or irrational. What is 
rational depends on the social or institutional setting
within which the act is embedded" (22-23). The foundations 
for the "social or institutional setting," according to 
Thompson and his colleagues, are described as "ways of 
life." Each of the five possible ways of life provides a 
vision of the workings of nature and of society. When an 
individual holds to a particular way of life, the elements 
of political culture: identity, rules, beliefs, are largely 
set. Change may occur as individuals move from one way of 
life to another, but stability of the collective system is 
maintained as long as the distribution of individuals 
within the five categories is roughly constant (25-100) .
Adding these insights to a theory of culture makes an 
integration of culture and ideology possible. If the ways 
of life are the foundations of culture and provide the 
setting for reasoning, they would also be the foundation 
for ideologies. A source of cultural and ideological 
variation is also evident in the existence of alternative 
ways of life even within a single society. But the culture 
concept remains fairly vague; what is its form within human 
reasoning? Which factors are important to stability and 
change? How do only five ways of life translate into the 
vast array of issue publics identified by Converse?
The sociological line of research has left students of 
public opinion with questions. Other efforts to interpret 
the opinions of Americans have begun with a shift in focus.
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This shift has resulted in attention being given to 
political thought at the individual level. Often borrowing 
heavily from psychological theories, researchers have 
attempted to construct a model of the individual belief 
system, and then examine the universality of the model.
The following is a more detailed exploration of some of 
these ideas.
One body of research has evolved around the 
recognition that individual issue opinions, like opinions 
generally are evaluations: "Every opinion is a marriage of 
information and values - information to generate a mental 
picture of what is at stake and values to make a judgement 
about it" (Zaller 1991, 1215). As such, the reasoning 
goes, individual issue evaluations are made by comparing 
issue alternatives to a set of values or priorities which 
the individual holds. If numerous issue positions are 
derived from one or two deeply held values, there would be 
constraint in the structure of the individual belief 
system. This type of constraint is usually referred to as 
vertical constraint (Bern 1970), as opposed to the 
horizontal constraint proposed by Converse (1964). In this 
research, the fundamental values through which people 
evaluate policies are described as "core values." As 
numerous opinions are expected to be grounded in a fairly 
narrow core, the structure of such belief systems is 
described as hierarchical. Furthermore, if large segments
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of the population share core values, this model is easily 
generalizable to the population. Consequently, it does 
make sense to speak of mass belief systems despite the 
theoretical grounding in individual psychological 
phenomena. This latter observation has guided the choosing 
of the specific core values which have been empirically 
examined. As a rule, investigators have concentrated their 
search for core values in the political culture literature, 
arguing that the political culture is a set of commonly 
held values.
Lane (1973) was among the first to study systems of 
political belief as psychological phenomena and to suggest 
that specific opinions are grounded in general principles. 
Though their primary concern is the importance of schemas, 
Conover and Feldman (1980; 1984) incorporate this depiction 
of belief system structure into their own research. They 
argue that different schemas exist at different levels of 
abstraction (1984, 98) with one general schema of "basic 
human nature and social interaction" at the most abstract 
level (104). Empirically, they find that opinions at the 
various levels which they establish are indeed highly 
correlated. Thus, though the evidence of schemas in this 
work has been questioned (Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland, 
1991) the evidence of vertical constraint is clear (Conover 
and Feldman 1984, 113).
Hurwitz and Peffley (1987; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985) 
have achieved similarly remarkable results by directing 
their focus on foreign policy beliefs. Building on 
previous, descriptive opinion analysis, they propose a 
three tiered structure for foreign policy belief systems, 
with "general postures" expected to be intermediary factors 
between core values and specific issue positions. 
Empirically, this domain specific approach proves valuable: 
"the general pattern of our results, however, clearly 
indicates that when constraint is measured as a series of 
vertical relationships between attitudes at different 
levels of abstraction, the degree of structure among 
foreign-policy attitudes is generally impressive" (1111) .
In explaining their findings, Hurwitz and Peffley 
respond to the question "'How is it possible for ordinary 
citizens to put together a consistent outlook on politics, 
given they know so little about it?'" They answer by 
citing the social-psychological importance of heuristics. 
Such a structure as they have described simplifies the 
environment and makes up for absence of information; "thus, 
a paucity of information does not impede structure and 
consistency, it motivates the development and employment of 
structure" (1114) .
This observation requires comment. In these authors' 
own words, the sphere of international politics is 
extremely "complex" and "ambiguous" (1103). This is true
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of most all of politics. So while it may be meaningful to 
speak of elites who have more information than the general 
public, it is certainly meaningless to speak of anyone as 
having complete and perfect information. In the words of 
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, "the problem...is not that 
mass publics know too little, but that no one knows enough" 
(1991, 71). Given, then, that "paucity of information," 
when compared to complete information, is a 
characterization of everyone, there is reason to believe 
that some sort of heuristic is a universal belief system 
characteristic. Any theory of belief systems must in some 
way provide for this act of simplification of reality.
Given the empirical evidence from this body of research, we 
should certainly expect a cognitive hierarchy to be an 
element of this process.
More recently, work on core values and belief system 
constraint was done by Feldman (1988). Feldman extracts 
three core values from political culture literature. These 
values are belief in equality of opportunity, support for 
economic individualism, and support for the free enterprise 
system (419). Recognizing that all three are components of 
Lockean liberalism, he theorizes that variations in the 
degree to which individuals believe in these values will 
explain variation in policy positions and, consequently, 
belief systems. Empirically, Feldman demonstrates that 
there is indeed significant variation among Americans in
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the importance of these values. But the relationship 
between these particular values and issue positions does 
not appear to be very strong; though one of Feldman's 
proposed values, equality of opportunity, does predict 
issue positions fairly consistently (427-429).
Feldman's results lead to speculation that other core 
values, perhaps not related to Lockean liberalism, are 
important. Leege and Welch (1989) explore values not 
related to liberalism. They have contributed to our 
understanding of the hierarchical structure of belief 
systems by focusing on a subset of the population. Namely 
their interest is in the foundational religious beliefs of 
Catholics. Their work is "grounded in the notion that, to 
understand religiosity, perceptions about the phenomena 
that religion is thought to address are more important than 
the embrace of doctrinal symbols or the associational 
practice of religious rituals" (138). Thus while most 
social scientists who examine religious elements focus on 
group membership, (see discussion below) these authors are 
interested in something more closely related to core 
values.
For Leege and Welch, foundational beliefs are, in 
part, "operating beliefs that interpret and give meaning to 
the reality perceived by the individual" (140). Within the 
Catholic church they identify and individualism- 
communitarianism continuum at the heart of belief
28
differences. And in fact differences along this scale are 
shown to have significant influence on some policy 
opinions. Specifically, the individualism-communitarian 
belief is a better predictor of private sphere issues, e.g. 
gender, family, etc. than more public policies such as race 
relations and defense (151-160).
Empirical results in the literature on core values and 
the structure of belief systems do seem to indicate that 
there is something to the concept; we should certainly not 
accept a null hypothesis that belief systems are not 
grounded in core values. Nevertheless, some fundamental 
questions remain: how core is core? and what exactly 
constitutes a value? The most pressing question, however, 
is one of verisimilitude; do core values accurately reflect 
how people think about politics? Do abstract concepts like 
freedom or isolationism exist independently in peoples 
minds, perhaps along with a specific definition? Or do 
these values exist in some sort of cognitive context?
These questions require a slightly more broad theoretical 
perspective for their exploration.
The real contribution of core values research is that 
it demonstrates very clearly the theoretical link between 
the sociological and psychological approaches to the study 
of belief systems. It is apparent that core values have 
sociological origins, often being derived from the 
individual's cultural environment. This theoretical
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relationship between sociological and psychological 
explanations is further indication that an integrative 
theory of the type suggested by Bennett is possible.
Another theoretical perspective on belief systems has grown 
out of Converse's (1964) finding that nearly half of the 
population evaluated policies in terms of how they affected 
various social groups. Theoretically, the argument is 
offered that individuals form psychological attachments to 
groups and evaluate policies based on expected impact on 
those groups. Kinder summarizes much of the research which 
had been published in this area prior to the time he wrote 
his synopsis of the public opinion literature (1983). At 
that time the key discoveries were that class was not a 
significant factor in American public opinion, but that 
race was strongly related to opinions on racial issues 
(405-06). The importance of the latter finding is 
magnified if the Carmines and Stimson (1982, 1989) argument 
about the centrality of race in mass belief systems is 
accepted.
Subsequent to the Kinder summary, numerous theoretical 
refinements have been suggested. Wald, Owen, and Hill 
(1988, 1990), for example, have focused attention on 
churches as social groups of some import in the structure 
of belief systems. In their study of the political 
cohesion of protestant churches, they find a great deal of
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variation between congregations in the degree of solidarity 
of members' opinions. In general fundamentalist churches, 
ones with strong beliefs in moral traditionalism, the 
authority of the bible, and "commitment to the church as a 
source of truth," are found to be far more unified than 
more liberal churches (1990, 209-213).
The importance of this work lies in its uniting of 
social groups and a notion clearly similar to core values. 
It is clear in this research that the degree to which the 
social group plays an important role in political opinions 
is related to the sharing of certain fundamental beliefs. 
Though in the case of churches this may be a product of the 
self selection process of voluntary membership, the basic 
finding may also apply to non-voluntary groups. For 
example, the importance of race in political attitudes may 
be a consequence of shared fundamental values.
The empirical findings of Miller, Wlezien, and 
Hildreth (1991) support this proposition. As is true of 
much of the literature in this field, the trick to 
exploring the importance of group membership to belief 
systems is ascertaining which particular groups are 
important to people. Miller and his associates attempt to 
get beyond demographic characteristics and explore how 
social groups cluster together in the minds of citizens. 
They do this by factor analyzing feeling thermometers about 
various demographic groups. From the rather extensive
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lists of groups asked about in the NES, three or four 
definite factors (depending on the year) emerge from this 
procedure. The strength of these factors indicates that 
people generally recognize similarities and differences 
between the groups which go beyond superficial 
categorization. Thus, these findings are consistent with 
the suggestion that the feeling thermometer evaluations are 
grounded in perceptions of values held by the groups 
compared to values held by the individual (Brady and 
Sniderman 1985). This interpretation is further supported 
by the additional finding that these factors are themselves 
good predictors of candidate and party evaluations (Miller, 
Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991) .
Shingles (1989) makes a similar contribution to our 
understanding of the importance of social groups. He does 
so, however, by focusing on intra-group differences rather 
than assuming intra-group similarities. His concern is the 
upper end of the traditional social stratification. Prior 
literature offers two seemingly contradictory arguments 
about what the values and consequent policy opinions of 
this group should be: one suggests that elites are more 
conservative, the other that they are more liberal.
Shingles finds that the resolution to this paradox lies in 
part in the distinction between status and class; status 
being roughly understood as a prestige or educated elite 
while class is defined in purely economic terms (1989).
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This is further indication that what is important to policy 
opinion is not superficial group membership but common 
values perhaps generated by common experience.
Recently an altogether new tack has been taken in the study 
of social groups and systems of political belief. Rather 
than focusing on group identity as a psychological 
characteristic, attribution theory explores the opinions 
people have about groups to which they do not belong. 
Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth (1991) have given us some 
indication of positive or negative feelings about various 
groups, but the attribution approach stresses the 
importance of characteristics which people assign to 
others. The suggestion is that assigning certain 
characteristics to persons will influence political 
evaluations. These persons may be individual candidates 
for office or large segments of the population. The object 
of study may be voting behavior or policy positions. But 
there are common elements of political evaluation as it is 
described within this theoretical context. These include 
persons, their actions, the character traits which lead to 
their actions, and the consequences of these actions. The 
following studies exemplify this research.
Conover's (1980) interest is in how people perceive 
and evaluate candidates for office. She suggests and 
demonstrates empirically that people attribute character
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traits to candidates in one of two ways depending on the 
amount of information they posses. Individuals who have 
very little accurate information may make "trait 
inferences." Trait inferences are made according to 
"stereotype or expectations about group characteristics" 
for groups of which the candidate is a member, e.g. party 
(94). For voters with a good deal of information on 
candidates' behavior, "causal attribution" is possible.
That is the candidates' characteristics are deduced 
directly from observation of the candidate him or herself 
(94-95). Of course, any interpretation of behavior will 
probably be tied to "stereotypes or expectations about 
group characteristics," so making this analytical 
distinction may be problematic. The important point, 
however, is that in either case, the key elements of 
cognition are persons, personalities, and corresponding 
behavior.
Sigelman and Knight (1985) perform a similar analysis 
of evaluations of the incumbent president. Their 
theoretical interest is the attribution of responsibility, 
particularly for the economy. Analyzing survey data, they 
find that personalizing, "holding the president personally 
and directly responsible for the economy," is "widespread" 
(187). This personalizing process tends to be independent 
of political knowledge.
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The importance of heuristics has been previously 
discussed, and implicit in this work is the idea that 
personalizing is a psychological act of simplification. 
Sigelman and Knight do not in any way suggest that those 
who personalize have a precise understanding of just how 
the president should limit inflation, for example. In 
fact, the two possible explanations they offer for 
personalizing are: people personalize due to ignorance, or 
because presidents and other elites "say" they can limit 
inflation. Again, in either case, the nature of the 
simplification is particularly revealing; it is personal, 
incorporating persons and the effects of their actions.
Turning to policy evaluations, Iyengar (1989)
"advances a domain-specific theory of public opinion in 
which the primary consideration that governs any issue 
position is the assignment of responsibility for the issue 
in question. In other words, individuals tend to simplify 
political issues by reducing them to questions of 
responsibility, and their issue opinions flow from their 
answers to these questions" (879). In order to test this 
theory, Iyengar examines the relationship between responses 
to questions about causal and treatment responsibilities 
for four social problems. The four problems are poverty, 
racial inequality, crime, and terrorism. Empirically he 
finds that the relationships are generally very strong. In 
most cases the attribution of responsibility variables are
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more powerful predictors of policy opinions than party 
identification or liberal/conservative orientation (889— 
893) .
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) find evidence of
similar cognitive structures. Recall the "desert
heuristic" cited above:
A perception that some person or group is in need 
gives rise to a search for causation (why does 
the need exist?). In turn, the causal 
conclusions that people reach have important 
implications for their reactions to the needy 
individual or group...Did the need arise as a 
result of some internal characteristic of the 
actor or some aspect of the external environment?
(72)
This is a fairly clear statement of the how the characters, 
character traits, actions, reactions, and consequences of 
attribution fit together in political reasoning.
The psychological attachment and attribution theories 
confirm Converse's initial findings that social groups are 
important elements of American public opinion. Beyond mere 
confirmation, however, they offer a much richer 
understanding of the nature of that importance; something 
more fundamental than demographics is at work here.
Neither elites nor masses should be lumped together 
indiscriminately when describing their belief systems. Any 
theory of mass belief systems should allow for 
substantially more complexity. Research into social 
groups, however, also gives rise to some optimism in the 
search for the foundations of belief systems. The
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integration of groups with values, which seems to emerge 
from recent studies, grants clarity and credence to both 
approaches. These theoretical advances make firmer the 
foundation for a still more broad theory of belief systems.
The psychological concept schema has provided still another 
approach to the study of belief systems. Though the value 
of the concept is somewhat controversial, research in this 
area has added to our understanding of political cognition.
Conover and Feldman (1984) explore the structure of 
political thinking given the fact that most people do not 
think ideologically (95). As these investigators use the 
term, a schema is a structure of memory which influences 
the way new information is received and the way stored 
information is retrieved (96). Extrapolating the 
implications of this concept, they argue that schema theory 
"helps to bridge the gaps among previous conceptualizations 
of the nature and structure of mass belief systems" (98).
As examples of this bridging they suggest that some schemas 
may be more abstract or general and thus function as core 
belief systems. Belief system constraint can also be 
conceptualized in schematic terms. In addition, particular 
schemas are believed to develop out of environmental 
interaction, but they then become internal mental 
structures. Thus this theory links the sociological and
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psychological approaches to the study of mass belief 
systems (99).
The empirical strategy adopted by Conover and Feldman 
is one in which they, as the researchers, "define the 
possible range of content (i.e. the elements) for each 
domain and at differing levels of abstraction, and then 
allow the respondents to identify, through some sort of 
rating task, the nature of the schemas that are most 
relevant to their own particular way of looking at that 
portion of the political world" (101-02). The Q-sort 
method is used which allows respondents to rank order 
opinions. Various sorts are established at various levels 
of abstraction. Next the results are factor analyzed to 
find patterns in the sorting. And finally, correlations 
between these factors are examined to determine their 
relationship to each other. The results indicate that 
there is a great deal of structure, especially vertical 
constraint, in the belief systems of the respondents.
There are numerous significant correlations between factors 
at the different levels of abstraction (113-14).
Continuing with the "bridging the gap" theme, Allen, 
Dawson, and Brown (1989) explore the relationship between 
schemas and the political beliefs of a particular social 
group, i.e., African-Americans. Beginning with the 
observation that blacks are generally different from whites
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in their political opinions, the authors search for the
origins of these differences. They argue that
racial identity is a multi-dimensional concept.
Each dimension is conceived as being based on one 
of the cognitive schema[s]. We assume that the 
African-American racial belief system is composed 
of multiple cognitive schema[s] and that these 
schema[s] are distinctive but interrelated 
cognitive constructs that vary across individuals 
in their degree of intensity within the black 
population (423).
In examining the qualities of a separate system of
political beliefs for a segment of the population, Allen,
Dawson, and Brown are also interested in the origins of
these mental constructs. They find that social status,
religious affiliation, and exposure to the black media are
important contributors to unique African-American schemas.
More generally, it is clear that personal experiences and
information sources do influence the reception and
arrangement of knowledge.
Lau, Smith, and Fiske (1991) look more directly to the
effects of schemas than to their sources. Of interest to
these authors is the filtering influence cognitive
structures have on tendencies to accept or reject policy
interpretations of others. In other words they focus on an
interpretive process. Utilizing a pair of experiments by
which they can control information, they find that previous
knowledge does influence the acceptance of policy
alternatives.
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Despite these apparent successes, there are problems 
with this approach to the study of belief systems. One 
such problem is the vagueness in the term "mental 
construct" which is offered as a definition of schema. 
Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland (1991) point out this and 
several other limitations of the schema concept. Factors 
such as those produced by Conover and Feldman "are 
statistical abstractions, not necessarily thoughts anyone 
in the sample has actually had" (1343). And if this is 
true of the factors themselves, it is certainly true of the 
correlations between the factors. These authors also point 
out that the concept itself is strikingly similar to the 
concept "attitude" (1345). Most importantly, however, is 
the observation that the theory "is at best incomplete," 
ignoring issues like "the coordination and integration of 
schemas, necessary to solving novel problems," "it has 
relatively little to say about the internal structure of 
schemas," and there is an absence of social context (1346).
The real advantage of the schema concept for the study 
of systems of political belief is not its originality or 
its completeness but that "bridging the gap" quality 
pointed out by Conover and Feldman (1984). This literature 
review has argued that many of the theoretical approaches 
to the study of belief systems may be related to each 
other. To date, schema theory provides the best integrated 
theory. It ties together in a single package experience,
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coiranunication of information, memory, interpretation of 
future experience and information, and evaluations of 
policy and other political stimuli.
The next theoretical step in belief system research 
should be the development of a similar but richer theory, 
one which spells out the nature of political cognition more 
precisely. A theory is required which incorporates context 
as well as flexibility, thereby explaining stability and 
change. The next two chapters attempt to construct such a 
theory utilizing the ideas and discoveries presented in 
this chapter as building materials.
CHAPTER II 
MYTHS AND POLITICAL BELIEFS
The initial assumption on which this chapter is built 
is that the black box approach to developing an integrated 
theory of belief systems is inadequate; even if the black 
box has a fancy name like schema. It is not sufficient to 
say schema has these origins: preachers, television; these 
functions: storage, retrieval; and these effects: 
filtering, interpretation. More detail is needed on the 
nature of cognitive constructs. What is it, for example, 
that holds individual schemas together and relates them to 
each other? What types of information are they capable of 
handling?
This chapter is a first pass at developing a more 
precise conceptualization of political cognition. A 
preliminary step in developing such a theory is the 
integration of two seemingly "divergent viewpoints" 
(Bennett 1977, 473). The first is the apparent importance 
of attribution theory in the study of belief systems. It 
has been shown that research in this area, especially the 
work by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991), indicates 
that the attribution of characteristics, attitudes, and 
responsibility to individuals and groups is an important 
aspect of political evaluation. A second quality of 
political cognition for which there is a great deal of 
evidence, but which seems to be quite different from
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attribution theory, is its hierarchical arrangement. 
Specific policy positions are thought to be grounded in 
more general political principles or values.
The argument that these two viewpoints can be 
integrated into a single theory begins with movement from 
each of them in the direction of greater theoretical 
generality. Each approach leaves an important question: 
the core values literature does not suggest a context for 
values, and the attribution literature does not explain the 
structural relationships of attributions. Might these two 
approaches mesh together on these points?
The key to the answer lies in the form of political 
cognition which is revealed in the attribution literature. 
Consider again as an example the desert heuristic described 
by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991). The cognitive 
glue that unites the persons, character traits, behavior, 
and responsibilities of attribution theory seems to be the 
story; plot is clearly implicit in this portrayal of 
reasoning. Political evaluations of presidents and 
policies seem to be grounded in anecdotal perceptions. 
However much or little information people do posses, that 
information seems to be stored and processed in a narrative 
form.
And there is evidence that this is not mere 
theoretical manipulation; when given a chance to explain 
their own beliefs, people often tell stories. Within an
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attribution theoretical context, Knight (1992) examines 
"natural language" responses to a question asking why black 
Americans are generally worse off than whites. Consider 
the following answers:
because the blacks they don't care//I'm saying 
that according to where you see there are many 
white people care more what they are doing, they 
are very much concerned about every day life 
whereas blacks they live according to, they don't 
have a systematic way of living...because a 
majority of women are on welfare and they have so 
many sexual partner who do not support them they 
just make them pregnant and that's when the women 
ends up being on welfare...(Table 1)
And from the opposite end of Knight's internal/external 
continuum of explanations:
lack of education and prejudice//inner city 
schools big city schools//most of the coloreds 
lived in the big city schools and most of the 
blacks got pushed into big city schools. When I 
went to school there were one or two colors, but 
when you go to a big school in the inner city in 
New York you get lost in the system...(Table 1)
Even in responses to this question consisting of only a few 
words, similar social phenomena are implied.
If narratives are common elements of political 
cognition, and if belief systems are hierarchically 
arranged, perhaps some sort of core narratives are the 
foundations of belief systems and provide a context for 
core values. These core narratives might exist as 
fundamental and general visions of the nature of social 
relationships, with other, less abstract stories derived
therefrom. In other words, rather than precise definitions 
of concepts like freedom, for example, belief systems may 
be based in visions of unrestricted social interaction. It 
should be noted that there is nothing in the core values 
literature which precludes their having such a context. 
Consequently, uniting these two theoretical approaches is a 
reasonable analytical step in the search for an integrated 
theory of belief systems.
Guided by an interest in the role of core narratives 
in systems of political belief, this chapter brings a 
wholly different literature to bare on the study of belief 
systems. This literature is on an existing social science 
concept which seems most similar to an idea of core 
narrative, namely myth. This chapter will begin with a 
discussion of myth. This presentation will consist of some 
basic and generally agreed upon observations about its 
nature, origins, and functions. An example of a particular 
myth relevant in the American political context will then 
be discussed in an effort to clarify these issues. Next 
the relationship between the concepts myth and belief 
system will be explored. What will emerge from this 
discussion is a tremendous theoretical similarity between 
the nature and function of myth and the phenomena belief 
system. Finally, some of the characteristics of a myth 
based belief system will be discussed.
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Myth is a central concept in the study of human behavior as 
undertaken by anthropologists and scholars in related 
fields. Whether ancient or modern, domestic or exotic, 
societies can be analyzed and compared in terms of the 
myths which inform the lives of the people in them. Myths 
are often seen as being at the core of particular patterns 
of societal arrangement and interaction. The relevance of 
myth to many aspects of politics has also been observed. 
Eliade, for example, reveals the structural similarities of 
grand political ideologies like Marxism and Aryanism and 
some very ancient myths (1960, 25-27). Lasswell and Kaplan 
(1950) point out the importance of myths in maintaining 
social order.
Though they are narratives and to some extent elements 
of imagination, the term myth does not imply a lie. Rather 
the relationship between a myth and experience is very 
intimate and, as will be shown, circular. "'Myth' means a 
'true story' and, beyond that, a story that is a most 
precious possesion because it is sacred, exemplary, 
significant (Eliade 1963, 1). For example, while the 
details regarding the characters and their activities may 
not be empirically accurate, the myth may reveal some acute 
insight into the nature of human motivations and actions 
(Jung 1958).
Blumenberg (1985) argues that the creation and 
duration of myths stem from the complexity of mankind's
environment. He points out that this environment is too 
complex to allow full comprehension. How ever vast and 
varied experience may be, only "partial knowledge" of this 
world will be achieved. The myth is a narrative created to 
weave the elements of this partial knowledge into a more 
holistic vision of reality. In other words the imagination 
is brought to bare on an incomplete and incoherent 
collection of facts transforming them into a cohesive image 
of interconnected parts. Thereby myths enable people to 
develop a picture of the world which is sensible and to 
interact with it in sensible ways.
It follows from this initial observation, that myths 
are the narratives which weave disparate experiences into 
whole cloth, that myths are intimately related to the 
empirical experiences and observations of life. For a myth 
to be meaningful, it must incorporate the partial knowledge 
which people have acquired. A story or set of stories 
which does not correspond to people's lived lives will not 
function as a myth for those people. As Halpern has 
observed, "the study of myth is the study of the origins of 
beliefs out of historical experience" (1961, 137).
The consequences of myth, so conceived, for thought 
and action are numerous. For example, these stories come 
to have a profound affect on perception of reality. A 
belief that the world is a certain way has a direct 
influence on what is seen and how what is seen is
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interpreted. According to Bern (1970) "we hold a 
nonconscious, zero-order faith in the credibility of our 
'internal' sense that is comparable in every way to our 
implicit trust in the credibility of our senses" (49). If 
myths are part of this internal sense, then they would be 
as important to our perception of reality as is physical 
sight. Myths may be held which do not allow comprehension 
of experience which does not fit the existing image of the 
world. Because of this 'nonconscious zero-order faith' in 
its rightness, new information and experience may be 
ignored or interpreted in such a way that the myth is 
preserved. Thus the relationship between myth and 
experience is not only intimate but circular; experience 
generates myth, and myth influences the interpretation of 
experience.
If, as has been suggested, myths mold empirical 
experiences into a coherent vision of the whole of reality, 
and they come to influence one's understanding of future 
empirical experiences, then myths are also intimately 
associated with an understanding of what is rational. At 
the most obvious level, any narrative must posses internal 
rational coherence. This would be particularly true of 
myths which are intended to supply order to our perceptions 
and discoveries. This is an important point to make as, in 
the "Enlightened" world, myth and reason are often seen as 
mutually exclusive; myths are viewed as irrational beliefs.
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For some, the very purpose of science is to dispel myths 
and other unfounded beliefs. As the term is described by 
those scholars cited here, however, science, or any other 
body of rational inquiry, would be impossible without a 
myth structure providing its foundation. Blumenberg in 
fact states explicitly that even during the Enlightenment 
there was no move from mvthos to logos, but that both are 
used to deal with the "absolutism of reality." (xi-xii) 
Consider also Geertz's observation that along with 
other aspects of public discourse, myths "are felt somehow 
to sum up, for those whom they are resonant, what is known 
about the way the world is, the quality of the emotional 
life it supports, and the way one ought to behave while in 
it" (1973). This statement expresses an important point 
about myths and their relationship to reason. It is at the 
level of myth that the positive and the normative are 
linked. "What is known about the way the world is" becomes 
a standard for evaluation of "the way one ought to behave 
while in it," that is, a standard for human behavior.
There is life and activity in accordance with one's 
perception of reality, and life at odds with that 
perception. To give one example, a myth that informs its 
adherents that men are the dominant gender may lead to the 
rational conclusion that men should be the leader of the 
family unit. Within such a belief system, a matriarchal 
family would be viewed as an aberration. Politically
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speaking, within such a society matriarchal families may be 
illegal.
Beyond these functions within individual 
consciousness, myths play important roles at the 
collective, social level. Like most stories, myths are 
related by their adherents to others. In various ways, 
intentional and unintentional, direct and indirect, people 
express the elements of the myths which provide order in 
their lives, which tie together the partial knowledge which 
they have acquired. Thus listeners, those who are seeking 
a unifying vision, are exposed to existing myths. To the 
extent that one or more of these myths mesh with the 
listeners own empirical experience, they may be accepted as 
valid, as stories revealing truth.
It is in this way that myths become a binding force in 
societies and for groups within societies; myths are not 
only reactions to a complex environment but also play an 
active role in communities. The narratives which the 
individual will find most meaningful are those he or she 
hears from people who have had similar experiences. The 
result is connectedness. To the degree that myths are 
shared, the individual will find a place in a society of 
like minded individuals. Myths, then, can be described as 
defining a social context and social orientation for the 
individual (Geertz 1973).
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Myths are understood to be very powerful and 
fundamental narratives structuring a person's orientation 
to his or her environment. They link together the parts of 
that environment into a cohesive vision of reality.
Thereby, they have an impact on what is seen, what is 
understood to be rational, and on evaluations of human 
behavior. They are attributes of the individual 
consciousness which, when shared with others, provide a 
social context for action and interaction. We can 
conclude, therefore, that not only are they not illusions 
or falsehoods, myths are at the heart of what is perceived 
as being true.
These issues will be clarified by putting some flesh on 
these theoretical bones. In order to demonstrate the 
character and function of myth in the American political 
environment, a discussion of the historical evolution of an 
important American narrative follows. This discussion is 
intended to be suggestive not exhaustive; it is intended as 
a discussion of an example of the existence and functioning 
of myths in the United States, not as a definitive analysis 
of all of the important narratives.
The most obvious candidate for a myth base of American 
politics is liberalism. The importance of liberalism in 
American politics generally, and public opinion 
specifically, is well documented (e.g. Devine 1972; Elazar
51
1972; Feldman 1983; Hartz 1955; McCloskey and Zaller 1984; 
Sniderman and Brody 1970). But why refer to liberalism as 
a myth? Consider the following portrayal of its role in 
American history.
The dominant narratives in the American context are 
the oldest ones, those which informed the writing of the 
Constitution and continue to provide fundamental values in 
many people's thoughts about politics. As a rule, these 
stories are products of the Enlightenment and its vision of 
people and society. Within this context, Locke told a 
story of a state of nature in which individuals existed in 
isolation, working and accumulating property. But property 
and other aspects of personal autonomy could be threatened 
by rivals. Thus the plot of this narrative is advanced by 
a kind of deus ex machina known as the social contract.
This contract brings the force of society to the defence of 
the individual. Once the contract is accepted and members 
of society are protected from their aggressive neighbors, 
very little in the way of additional social control is 
needed.
The importance of this and similar stories to the 
authors of the Constitution has been noted by many 
commentators on the document. Some commentators also note 
how the experiences of the American founders created 
variations in this Enlightenment story. Gordon Wood 
(1969), for example, focuses his attention on the
52
historical period between the Articles of Confederation and 
the Constitution. He argues that by the time the colonies 
gathered to form a new national government, new stories 
were being told: stories about legislative tyranny and 
Daniel Shays. The writing of the Constitution required 
that these new stories be integrated with older stories 
about despotism and the evil of centralized authority. As 
a result the Constitution does establish a much stronger 
centralized government than did the Articles of 
Confederation, one which is constrained by indirect 
democracy.
Historically, the progressive period was a time of 
large scale myth adaption to new experience. In this case, 
the experiences were the consequences of the industrial 
revolution. These consequences included political 
corruption, unhealthful production techniques and consumer 
products, and an expanding gap between the very wealthy few 
and the very poor masses (Noble 1981). Progressivism as an 
intellectual response to these conditions has proven very 
difficult to define, but one of its key elements is some 
alteration of the Lockean myth of the social contract and 
its insurance of equality. A new character had entered the 
American plot, the industrial tycoon. In addition to his 
responsibility for the above problems, his very existence 
was seen by many as proof of the inadequacy of the dominant 
myth, as evidence that equality would not naturally be
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maintained in a free society. In response to this new 
force in society, a counter force was needed. Many came to 
accept the propositions of people like Thomas Hill Green 
that the government must accept this role, that the 
government should act as the defender of equality, that the 
government should play the role of hero of the workers to 
the tycoon's role as villain.
The myth of government playing the role of defender of 
the people came to exist side by side with a new, more pure 
form of the Lockean liberal myth known as social darwinism 
(Hofstadter 1955). In this latter story, the government 
continues to be seen as the principle threat to human 
fulfillment. Eventually these competing visions of society 
would be labeled ideologies.
In addition to changes in response to new historical 
circumstances, there have always been those people in 
American society for whom Locke's story was irrelevant.
This is particularly true for African-Americans. The 
existence of slavery is not an element of classical 
liberalism. Thus the institution existed in American 
politics as a kind of sub-text to the dominant social 
narrative. This aberrant position of slavery in relation 
to the ideals of equality and freedom manifested itself in 
the founders inability to adequately resolve the issue and 
the consequent war, and in the alienation of blacks from 
American politics.
54
In the contemporary American political environment, 
things have changed and stayed the same. There is evidence 
that blacks, having been at least partially assimilated 
into American politics, have adopted traditional American 
stories (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989). The more profound 
change, however, has been yet another alteration of the 
liberal myth from telling a story of equal individuals free 
from government interference, to a story of competing 
interest groups struggling to influence the actions of the 
government. Contemporary American politics is dominated by 
a story entitled pluralism (Dahl, 1989).
This brief sketch of some key developments in American 
history demonstrates how liberalism has functioned, how it 
captured the minds of the founders as the fundamental 
narrative about human interactions. Liberalism has worked 
to unite and divide American society throughout our 
history. It has influenced understanding of and reaction 
to experience while at the same time adapting itself to a 
changing world, integrating new characters and actions as 
necessary.
But is referring to liberalism as a myth rather than 
culture, ethos, or schema a mere word game? Demonstrating 
the advantages of a myth based belief system over the other 
theoretical frameworks requires a more detailed 
understanding of the theory of the former. Consequently, a
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discussion of the general characteristics of myth and their 
relevance to systems of political opinion is required.
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the 
conceptual compatibility of myth and belief system. Given 
the state of the literature in this sub-field, the first 
step in theoretical development must be a detailed 
examination of the object of study; a prerequisite of any 
proposed theory must be that it potentially explains the 
phenomena under investigation. As indicated by previous 
research, an account of individual belief systems must 
incorporate standards of evaluation, provide for some kind 
of systematic simplification of political reality, explain 
foundations for assimilation and interpretation of 
experience and information, and allow rational integration 
of various aspects of politics. At the collective level, 
an account of the mass belief system must explain 
similarities and differences between individuals. The 
concept myth can account for these elements of belief 
systems .
As noted above, the context in which belief systems 
are formed is a factor of some moment in choosing an 
appropriate theoretical explanation. To understate the 
obvious: the political world is complex. It may not be the 
"absolutism of reality" which, Blumenberg argues, myths are 
created to explain, but it is a pretty good chunk of that
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reality. Only partial knowledge of political reality is 
possible given its vastness and intricacy. In the words of 
Christopher Achen, "the sheer volume of business in a large 
nation makes it impossible for even the most studious voter 
to follow more than a fraction of it" (1975, 1218) .
Consider the issue of defense spending. Even if the value 
of preserving national security regardless of cost is a 
rational initial assumption, what kind of information 
should an individual have in order to reach a conclusion on 
whether spending should be increased or decreased? The 
most superficial thought on the subject reveals that one 
would have to know: current spending, efficiency of 
spending, what is purchased, the same information on our 
potential enemies, and some fairly sophisticated 
understanding of military strategy. I propose that most 
people who have an opinion on defense spending have very 
little of this information. And our democratic political 
process expects us to formulate opinions on many such 
issues; issues as important to life and happiness as they 
are complex.
This combination of the complexity and importance of 
political questions is indication that an examination of 
myths may reveal something of the nature of belief systems. 
Recall that one of the important functions of myth is the 
simplification of an environment which is far too vast and 
intricate for us to comprehend. Even the political
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environment is far too vast and intricate for us to 
comprehend. The various "ideas and attitudes" which 
comprise a belief system, consequently, must be grounded in 
some simplified conceptions of that environment. The idea 
of myth provides a parsimonious and powerful explanation of 
this process.
Further indication of the theoretical compatibility of 
myth and belief system is revealed by continuing this 
comparison of what a myth is to what a belief system is.
As commonly operationalized, the "ideas and attitudes" 
which comprise a belief system are various policy positions 
(see chapter one). Like most opinions, these policy 
positions are evaluations. In turn, the act of evaluation 
is an act of comparison to some standard or expectation.
The issue of gun control, for example, is compared against 
the standard of beliefs about what contributes to personal 
security. One person might conclude that he or she would 
be safer if guns were more difficult to obtain and there 
were fewer of them in society. This leads to the 
conclusion that increased regulation is a good. Another 
individual might conclude that he or she would in fact be 
less secure to the extent that self protection was made 
difficult by limits on the acquisition of fire arms. Thus 
opposition to gun control is the logical policy position 
for such a person to hold. Both of these lines of 
reasoning stem from different expectations about the
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relationship between human behavior and weapons. The first 
believes that ease of acquisition of guns contributes to 
the likelihood that a person will use one in committing a 
violent crime. The latter assumes that there are those 
people who will commit violent crimes regardless of 
circumstances, and that those people will obtain guns 
regardless or legal restrictions. Consequently, the only 
option is personal defense. Almost any political issue 
requires a similar sort of evaluation built on 
expectations, built on beliefs about the way the world is. 
Any explanation of belief systems must explain this 
process.
Based on the observations above, myth may well provide 
such an explanation. The narratives which unify our 
understanding of reality do provide us with our 
understanding of the positive, "criminals will have guns," 
which become the basis of the normative, "I should be free 
to protect myself." Different perceptions of the real 
world, "guns themselves contribute to crime," lead to 
different evaluative conclusions, "gun ownership should be 
restricted." Both of the statements of fact reveal the 
narrative links between people and between people and 
objects in the awareness of the individuals who accept 
them. They may have there origins in empirical experience 
or in socialization. As they stand, however, they are two 
different perceptions of the way the world is which lead to
59
two different conclusions about what should be done. In 
this way myth meets yet another test for a theoretical 
framework appropriate to the study of belief systems; it 
can explain variations in opinions on individual policy 
issues.
It can also inferred that the concept myth sheds light 
on how various policy positions cluster together into 
individual belief systems. Implicit in most researchers' 
understanding of belief system is the expectation that 
rationality will be an integral part of its "constraint."
In examining belief systems, we look for how the various 
elements are rationally integrated into a whole. Again the 
theory of myth outlined above appears to be precisely on 
point. Rational narratives, in connecting observations, 
discoveries, and partial knowledge, provide the very 
foundation of an understanding of what constitutes a 
rational relationship. One understanding of the world 
allows an individual to see support for abortion and 
opposition to the death penalty as rationally compatible 
issue positions. For another person, one who sees both as 
acts of murder, for example, this is an irrational 
combination of issue positions. Almost any pair or set of 
issue positions can be rationally compatible depending on 
the individual's fundamental orientation to reality. Myths 
are understood to provide just such fundamental 
orientations.
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These three factors, issues of simplification, 
evaluation, and constraint, demonstrate the importance of 
myths to the individual belief system; there is reason to 
believe they are central elements of political cognition. 
This is not the end, however, of the theoretical relevance 
of myth to belief system. Myths are social phenomena as 
well. Communities with common experiences often share 
narrative portrayals of that experience. Consequently, 
myth provides an explanation of how individual belief 
systems are integrated into mass belief systems. According 
to the ideas presented here, individual belief systems 
should be linked at their core; mass belief systems should 
be built on common foundations.
Collectively, these observations on the nature of 
myths and belief systems suggest the existence of a 
powerful theoretical infrastructure. The created and 
received character of myths allows an understanding of 
variation, pattern, and patterns of variation in people's 
understanding of reality. Any explanation of belief 
systems must allow similar understanding. Myths function 
as standards of evaluation and foundations of rationality. 
Belief systems are expected to be rationally coherent 
clusters of evaluations. Myths also function to simplify 
reality. The formation of opinions in a complex, 
democratic political environment requires some process of 
simplification.
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Though by no means complete, an image of myth based belief 
systems is beginning to develop. A few of its 
characteristics are now discernable.
One conclusion supported by this discussion of myths 
is that they are as varied as the experiences which they 
are created to encompass. Various myths may be appropriate 
to various realms of experience: religious myths express 
metaphysical experience, cultural myths relating visions of 
social relationships, family myths uniting those of common 
hearth. Within any individual consciousness, myths from 
these and perhaps many more categories will coexist. Any 
society might be held together by a shared myth relevant to 
a particular realm of experience. For example, a 
particular story of power relationships between various 
elements of society might be commonly accepted by citizens. 
This political myth may contribute to long term political 
consistency (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950).
In the United States, however, though a dominant myth 
seems to exist, Lockean liberalism, the student of public 
opinion must recognize the existence of a variety of core 
narratives. For example, as discussed above, this myth is 
foreign to the experiences of African-Americans. Further, 
diversity should be expected as a product of the 
permeability of our national boarders. The country is not 
an isolated society in which a dominant myth remains 
unchallenged. Immigration of people and their narrative
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traditions has been a constant factor in the nation's 
history. Furthermore, the United States is a very large 
and heterogeneous nation with a population exposed to a 
broad range of experiences; consider the contrast between 
the South and the rest of the union (Key 1977) . And as 
previously discussed, experience is the source of creation 
and revision of myths. For these reasons also, it is 
prudent to expect the presence of numerous myths in the 
public opinion of Americans.
Further complicating the analysis of the relationship 
between myths and public opinion is the fact that 
explicitly political myths are not the only ones which 
might be relevant to belief systems. Just as politics is 
not isolated from other elements of society, neither are 
only political experiences influential on political 
opinions. Religious myths, for example may be an important 
factor for all or any part of an individual's political 
belief system. Consequently, analysis should not be 
limited to narratives which appear to be political in 
nature.
Another point which requires consideration: shared 
myths are not static but may be altered by personal 
experience. Here again there is reason to be cautious in 
expectations of observable manifestations of the theory. 
Even a powerful, political myth like liberalism may present 
itself in slightly differentiated forms from person to
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person. One person, for example, may have been affected by 
an encounter with poverty which may have led him or her to 
recognize the need for some limits on social freedom. 
Context, therefore, is a crucial aspect of how a myth 
functions within a particular belief system.
Much of what is true of shared myths is also true of a 
host of more humble narratives. Personal encounters with 
the world and personal creativity produce narratives which 
are potentially unique to the individual. Past events are 
remembered and future events anticipated in narrative form 
(Crites 1971). Consider again the desert heuristic as 
described by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) . They 
have argued that individuals evaluate policies based on 
perceptions about characters, character traits, future 
interactions with the government based on knowledge of 
previous interactions, and other such narrative elements. 
Evaluations of and responses to daily life are grounded in 
a plethora of such depictions of reality. It is clear that 
these more personal and mundane stories are also elements 
of political belief systems. But how do these differ from 
more social and broader myths? Would it be possible to say 
anything of significance about these daily narratives 
outside of their mythical context?
Ultimately, it must be the whole narrative cloth which 
serves as the foundation of interaction with and evaluation 
of political reality. Individuals develop a system of
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beliefs about relationships expressed in a narrative 
format, a format which is grounded in empirical experience 
but is also a simplification and an interpretation of that 
experience. At the individual level, it now appears that 
belief systems are built on a rather intricate narrative 
web. In this context, myths may be thought of as the 
strands which are common to many of the individual webs.
Taken as a whole, then, the narrative web is a mental 
network of characters. These characters may be 
individuals, groups, prototypical representatives of 
groups, governments, etc. These actors are perceived as 
displaying particular character traits, e.g. laziness, 
aggressiveness, corruption. These character traits play an 
important role in the actions and interactions of the 
characters which comprise the plots of the stories. 
Circumstances and settings also play an important role in 
how plots develop. The various elements of this mental 
network can be learned from others, memories of experience, 
or anticipated scenarios. Together they provide an image 
of how the world is, how vast amounts of raw information 
fit together to form a rational whole. They become 
foundations of emotional response as well as standards of 
evaluation for the individual.
Though there will be originality within any individual 
narrative pattern and corresponding belief system, we also 
expect that many of the individual threads are shared by
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many members of society. There are shared experiences and 
there are common narratives which give context and meaning 
to those shared experiences. These common threads, shared 
myths, are the most appropriate focus of analysis of mass 
belief systems. Though they constitute only a part of any 
individual web, it is an important part. The discussion of 
myths above leads us to expect them to play a rather 
foundational role within the web.
This image of a myth based belief system is a very 
complex one. One element of this complexity is that belief 
systems are expected to be belief systems in flux, 
constantly evolving as they respond to the environment. 
Furthermore the nature of that response, or even the 
direction of evolution, defies prediction because any 
response to new information or experience is partially 
influenced by previous experiences and existing myths.
Thus variation in myths and other stories will lead to 
various responses to identical experience. Furthermore, 
this theoretical description not only allows, but requires 
acts of creativity. The myths are not directly caused by 
experience but are themselves part and parcel of belief 
systems.
Though built on a rather simple foundation, the theory 
of myth based belief systems as portrayed so far is quite 
unwieldy. It is plagued by intricacy, indeterminacy, and 
change. Is any systematic analysis of such a system
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possible? The answer to this question is yes, but it 
requires a certain transformation in the vision of the 
analyst.
CHAPTER III
NARRATIVES AND A SELF-ORGANIZED BELIEF SYSTEM
Before attempting to deal with the problems raised by 
suggesting a myth foundation for belief systems, this 
chapter also begins by building directly on previous 
research. Whereas the previous chapter deals largely with 
the nature of political beliefs, the concern here is the 
nature of the system. Thirty years of belief system 
investigation has not answered the basic question. Do 
various beliefs fit together in a simple casual arrangement 
as does a solar system? Are they part of a more complex 
system involving a feedback loop with the environment? Or 
are they simply random clusters of beliefs signifying 
nothing?
Or are they something else? This possibility has not 
been generally considered in the analysis of belief systems 
because political scientists have been limited in their 
view of nature by a Newtonian paradigm. In some of the 
physical sciences, however, systems have been discovered 
which do not conform to the classic laws of motion nor of 
thermodynamics. These systems are not reducible to linear, 
causal explanations. Instead they evidence properties of 
"self-organization."
The first part of this chapter demonstrates that 
systems of political belief are best conceived of as self­
organized systems. The evidence'that this is the case is
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drawn from extant research. I will proceed in this 
demonstration by presenting several of the properties which 
are common to most self-organized systems. The discussion 
of each property will be followed by observations from 
political scientists about belief systems. Taken 
collectively, these observations indicate that belief 
systems are typical of self-organized systems.
The movement from a traditional conception of system, 
to a self-organized one has been described as requiring a 
"Gestalt shift" on the part of the analyst. That is, 
analysts must see two faces instead of a vase; a mature 
woman rather than a young one. If this shift is accepted 
as worthwhile by students of belief systems, an entirely 
new research program is implied, new goals of analysis are 
required. As will be demonstrated below, the 
characteristics of a self-organized system make some of the 
objectives of earlier research impossible to achieve. 
However, these same characteristics open up a whole new set 
of fascinating questions about how systems act and 
interact.
One question which can be asked about such systems is 
"what is the organizational process which guides the 
systems development?" In the second part of this chapter,
I will argue that narrative is the organizational process 
for systems of political belief. In this context, a more 
fully developed discussion of the importance of narrative
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generally and myth specifically in cognition will be 
presented. While chapter two presented an argument that a 
relationship between myth and belief system is possible, 
the second part of this chapter suggests that this 
relationship is likely. The chapter concludes with a 
summary portrayal of a myth based, self-organized belief 
system.
"Self-organized system" is a general term for phenomena 
discovered independently in many different fields of 
inquiry. These phenomena have been given this common label 
because there are several attributes which they generally 
share whether they consist of atoms, termites, or the 
weather. Many have suggested that human beings, our 
endeavors, and our societies are far more similar to these 
self-organized systems than they are to more linear systems 
of the type Newton explored (see essays in Scott 1989; and 
Krohn, Kuppers, and Nowotny 1990).
Of particular importance to the subject of this 
chapter is the argument that human reasoning displays the 
essential traits of such systems. Stadler and Kruse (1990) 
identify a fundamental paradox which is inherent in 
psychological research cast within the Newtonian paradigm; 
psychological awareness seems to be much greater than 
individual experience can account for (151-52). They 
continue with a demonstration of how a Gestalt theoretical
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framework provides resolutions to this paradox. Noteworthy 
is the striking similarity between Gestalt descriptions of 
mental phenomena and descriptions of other phenomena now 
described as self-organized: "Confronted with this immanent 
obstinacy, Gestalt theory has identified a number of 
fundamental principles of order formation in the cognitive 
system which anticipate in detail some of the concepts 
developed in the theory of complex non linear systems"
(182). Given this general observation along with our 
inability to adequately explain systems of political 
belief, exploration of the similarities between the self- 
organizational paradigm and current knowledge about 
political belief systems seems a worthwhile endeavor.
One general characteristic of a self-organized system 
is that relationships within the system are non-causal. 
Nevertheless, there remains an order to such systems. This 
is possible in situations where multiple outcomes are 
consistent with identical conditions. For example, X1 + X2 
+ X3 => Ylf or =>Y2. This transformation in 
conceptualization requires an appropriate change in the 
language used to describe the activity of such systems. It 
has been suggested that Toynbee's historical construct 
"challenge and response" is a more accurate description of 
the observed reality than is cause and effect. That is, 
environments provide challenges to which multiple responses 
are possible. For self-organized systems, it is impossible
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to say which response will occur in any given case (Scott 
1989, 3-9) .
There are, however, two characteristics of the 
responses. One, the possibilities are greatly restricted.
In the language of self-organization, only certain 
possibilities will be consistent with the system's own 
history. And two, examination of a series of responses 
will reveal a pattern. The pattern which emerges, as well 
as the number of cases which must be considered for the 
pattern to emerge, are system dependent. The pattern is 
the empirical manifestation of self-organization and is 
often referred to as an "attractor." It reveals the 
presence of something inside the system directing its 
development (Scott 1989, 10-14).
Thinking of political belief systems in these terms 
leads to a major change in approach to their study. In the 
study of political reasoning, the equivalent of causal 
thinking is to begin with assumptions about which policy 
positions logically go together. The analyst begins with 
assumptions about "what goes with what" as regards 
political opinions. Numerous scholars, however, have 
identified problems with this approach to relationships 
between political opinions. Brown (1970), for example, 
points out that researchers should not "employ their own 
logic to determine which items 'logically go together'"
(67; see also Grafstein 1990). The implication here is
72
that logic is not the cognitive equivalent of gravity- 
holding belief systems in rigid and universal patterns.
Even factor analysis, which explores whether people share 
"what goes with what" beliefs, is known to be problematic. 
It reveals only shared structures, not necessary ones 
(Conover and Feldman 1980).
Thus, sensitive appraisal of political cognition has 
revealed that it is not subject to the determinative forces 
of solar systems. Despite these objections, however, 
analysts have continued to utilize constructs such as 
labeling liberal and conservative positions on issues, 
perhaps in the absence of any better methods of analysis.
If there is reason to believe that a self-organized 
approach is appropriate, however, this paradigm may suggest 
alternatives.
A second characteristic of self-organized systems 
follows directly from the first and is also consistent with 
previous observations about political belief systems. This 
characteristic is complexity: "complexity is recognized as 
a genuine phenomena that does not lend itself to being 
reduced to something simple or being explained by the 
'overlapping' of simple elements" (Krohn, Kuppers, and 
Nowotny 1990, 6). In other words, the whole system is 
greater than the sum of its parts. This occurs as the 
various parts provide the context for each other. For 
example, the activities of a single ant make no sense
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outside of the context of the colony, neither do the 
particular activities of various groups of ants. Only 
within the framework of the entire system can any piece be 
seen as contributing to survival. Or to use an equation 
model again as an example, all independent variables in a 
self-organized system are interactive. If the American 
political process is thought of as such a system, the 
impact of being a woman on behavior within that process 
should be dependent on her race. The impact of being a 
black woman should depend on her class, and so forth.
Converse (1964) discovered that mass belief systems 
were far more complex than his concept of them could 
explain. Subsequent, research has attempted to provide 
theories capable of explaining this complexity and 
succeeded only in demonstrating that the complexity 
increases faster than theories attempting to explain it. 
Witness the number of factors which are now believed to be 
pertinent to the belief system: groups, culture, core 
values, ideology, etc. The impact of these factors seems 
not to be uniform; different people resolve different 
issues in different ways. In other words, the influence of 
any single factor seems to be dependent on context, and no 
single model captures the belief system phenomena. Thus, 
there is further indication that the self-organization 
framework may be relevant to belief system analysis.
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This complexity along with the indeterminate nature of 
internal relationships leads to a third observation on 
self-organized systems: they are not systems in a 
conventional sense. "The classical system-environment 
model according to which the adaption of a system to its 
environment is controlled externally and according to which 
the adaption of the system occurs in the course of learning 
process, is replaced by a model of systemic closure"
(Krohn, Kuppers, and Nowotny 1990, 6). In conventional 
analysis of social systems, outputs were believed to be 
explainable in terms of inputs. In many cases the system 
itself was accepted as a "black box" which was assumed to 
be a constant factor in all similar systems. For many 
systems, however, complexity and indeterminacy make output 
predictions impossible. Removing black box assumptions 
from traditional systems analysis would leave researchers 
with very little to say.
But the proposition that these systems are self- 
organized raises a new set of questions and provides a new 
framework for analysis. One of the areas of interest in 
these systems is the internal phenomena: "What are the 
mechanisms by which the system maintains itself and 
responds to the environment?" "What is revealed in the 
system's history which will give clues about how it will 
answer challenges?" Such questions get at the heart of the 
existence of self-organized systems. Therefore, "system
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closure" does not mean that the system is impervious to its 
environment; energy and information certainly must enter 
and exit. However, the system itself is believed to 
control the acceptance and use of this energy and 
information. The interesting question, then, becomes "how 
does the system make these decisions?"
Among the most extensive efforts to apply traditional 
systems analysis to systems of political belief is that of 
Robert Lane (1973), In reworking the theory to apply it to 
the observed complexity of belief systems, Lane describes a 
phenomena similar to a self-organized system. He 
recognizes, for example, that living systems have a 
property of agency. In other words, they are not 
programmed but rather actively make decisions. The bases 
for making these decisions, that is the internal dynamics 
of such a system, need to be included in analysis. 
Furthermore, this internal reality is generated by the 
system's past experience and mediates between inputs and 
outputs. Consequently, Lane argues, there are limits on 
the impact of feedback loops and, therefore, on the 
functional approach to an analysis of belief systems (91- 
96) .
Any inquiry such as Converse's (that is, an 
inquiry about the relationship between various 
political ideas) is in my view, at least partly 
an inquiry into political reasoning and therefore 
requires an analysis of the ways in which people 
think about politics. In order to do this 
analysis, one must examine the thinking and
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reasoning processes as well as the patterns of
association they produce (98).
The general character of self-organized systems gives 
us one more clue as to the nature of the internal reality. 
The study of these entities has led to the observation:
1 irregularity of nature is not treated as an anomaly but 
becomes the focus of research and thus is declared to be 
normal. One looks for regularity within irregularity. 
Non-Equilibrium processes are recognized as the source of 
order and the search for equilibrium is replaced by the 
dynamics of processes" (Krohn, Kuppers, and Nowotny 1990,
7). Such systems, then, are similar not to the extent to 
which they appear to be on the surface, but according to 
similarities in the processes which maintain their 
stability. In the language discussed above, two chaotic 
systems may respond to their environments in very different 
ways, but their responses may be governed by the same 
internal process. Thus vast degrees of superficial 
variation are possible because of the sensitivity of the 
internal processes to a host of contextual considerations 
and the complexity this generates. Nevertheless, this does 
not indicate that the individual systems are not governed 
by the same process.
In a social science context this ideas has been 
observed and expressed by Geertz: "Looking at the ordinary 
in places where it takes unaccustomed forms brings out not, 
as has often been claimed, the arbitrariness of human
behavior... but the degree to which its meaning varies 
according to the pattern of life by which it is informed 
(1973, 14). This conclusion was derived from observation 
of cultures, not from system theory. In a belief system 
context, our gaze is drawn sharply back to Converse's 
discovery of diversity in public opinion: "a realistic 
picture of political belief systems in the mass public, 
then, is not one that omits issues and policy demands 
completely nor one that presumes widespread ideological 
coherence; it is rather one that captures with some 
fidelity the fragmentation, narrowness, and diversity of 
these demands" (1964, 247). Efforts to explain this 
observation using constructs such as levels of 
conceptualization are not overly meaningful; this only 
makes a distinction between people whose opinions do not 
appear to be arbitrary and those whose opinions do. In 
contrast, the self-organized system theory suggests that 
"fragmentation, narrowness, and diversity" may conceal 
"patterns of life" or "dynamics of processes."
Taken as a whole, the literature on belief systems 
gives us reason to believe that a self-organized framework 
should be brought to bear on their analysis. If this is 
done, appropriate changes in the goals of research are also 
necessary. It must be recognized that numerous outcomes 
are consistent with any possible set of factors on which we 
choose to focus. Consequently, consistency between system
history and response to challenges rather than between 
stimulus and response should be explored. The dynamic 
processes of cognition itself should become an important 
object of investigation. Of particular interest are 
processes which, though very complex, i.e., wrought with 
context, and non-causal are capable of generating order 
within the individual belief system. (Order, here, 
indicates non-arbitrary responses.) At the macro or 
collective level, however, the irregular pattern of beliefs 
which has been regularly observed in American public 
opinion is consistent with expectations.
The suggestion that stories are common in political 
cognition, however, was derived from attribution literature 
which is generally consistent with a Newtonian paradigm 
(see especially Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1990 on 
"causal chains of reasoning"). Tracing the implications of 
this suggestion, though, led to the complex, indeterminate, 
evolving view of belief systems portrayed at the conclusion 
of chapter two. At this point, it is clear that, by 
coincidence or miracle (or self-organization), complex, 
indeterminate, and evolving looks like self-organization. 
All of the arrows of previous research are pointing in the 
same direction; Converse, Sniderman, Conover, Lane have all 
been looking at a self-organized system but not recognizing 
it as such.
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What then is the role of myths and other narratives in 
a belief system so conceived? To this point, in the 
analysis, narratives have been discussed as fixed entities. 
They are not, however, without their own dynamics. It is 
now appropriate to consider the nature of narrative 
processes. The following paragraphs describe narratives as 
processes themselves, as part larger cognitive processes, 
and all of these as organizational processes falling within 
the parameters of self-organized systems. This discussion 
begins with a more full explication of the reasons for 
expecting stories to be common elements of political 
reasoning.
The first observation to be made is that the story is 
the form of our social experience. That is we observe an 
intricate and complex web of human interaction even within 
our own limited, personal experience. Consequently, the 
story form is intimately familiar, being part of our day- 
to-day encounters with real people such as neighbors and 
co-workers. We notice that the people we meet have 
peculiar personality traits which produce patterns in their 
behavior. Responses to this behavior by others are in turn 
influenced by their own personality traits.
It follows from this first point that it would be 
reasonable and most parsimonious to simply internalize this 
form in our memories. In fact storing the isolated 
elements of our observations would seem very difficult.
80
This is one of the points on which schema theory has been 
attacked by its critics. A series of objects linked only 
by spatial or temporal proximity lack context, 
verisimilitude, and ignore issue like "the coordination and 
integration of schemas, necessary to solving novel 
problems" (Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland 1991, 1343-1346; 
quote on page 1346). By adding elements such as plot, the 
story form provides context, verisimilitude, coordination, 
and integration. Its ability to respond to novel 
situations will be discussed below.
Another observation to be made is that narrative 
functions as a form of discourse. Given the discussion 
above, it should be a common form of discourse. Thus, 
information often comes to us from others in the same form 
as directly from experience. Of importance for belief 
system research is one particular case of such 
communication. Through stories, the memory of experience 
may survive far longer than the individual or individuals 
who have an experience; that is, stories become histories. 
Such stories can become links between people spanning space 
and time. These histories become particularly poignant 
when the experience itself is repeated. In such cases, 
stories begin to define group identity.
These are a few reasons for expecting that attribution 
theory is on the right track in portraying the narrative 
form of political cognition. They show that the narrative
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form should indeed be an integral aspect of cognition. The 
potential relationship between narratives and belief 
systems needs to be examined more directly, however.
Step number one in political cognition is some act of 
simplification. The simplicity of the basic narrative form 
is evidenced by a plethora of stories which fascinate 
children, and many of the biblical stories which provide 
the foundation for Western social values. In addition, 
given the basic structure, filling in missing information 
or generalizing from a small amount of information is a 
rather simple act. The desert heuristic is again 
indicative; policy opinions potentially affecting millions 
are arrived at by substituting entire social classes in 
place of a small number of observed individuals. Thus the 
story is itself basically simple but can play an important 
role in integrating the complexities of reality.
Despite this simplicity, in fact because of it, 
possible permutations of the form are practically infinite. 
This is in part because of the various elements of a story 
which may or may not be present. In fact, the potential 
elements of the narrative form are all of the elements of 
life. Any organizational foundation of political cognition 
must be capable of incorporating all of the elements of 
human experience. Narratives do possess the potential to 
integrate all aspects of life generally and politics 
specifically: people, personalities, actions, inter­
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actions, reactions, emotions, desires, goals, physical and 
psychological settings, fact and fantasy. Two additional 
points on this issue are worth noting.
One of the difficulties which the belief system 
literature has faced is distinguishing cognition from 
affect. The attempt to do so is grounded in the assumption 
that reasoning is an abstracted, logical process and 
emotion and feelings are separate, irrational realities.
The story form, however, can and usually does hold these 
two elements of social experience tightly together. Again 
the desert heuristic is instructive. It provides a 
rational framework for arranging information, and deeply 
embedded within the framework are the emotional responses 
which call for a course of action.
A second point is also a response to other literature. 
In their recent work Cultural Theory, Thompson, Ellis, and 
Wildavsky (1990) suggest that there are five possible ways 
of life and offer a "typology of surprise" which explains 
movement by an individual from one to the other (69-81) .
In this typology, observations at odds with the accepted 
order of the universe accumulate in the memory in an 
additive fashion. Eventually the evidence against a way of 
life may be greater than the evidence for it and the 
individual will "jump" to an alternative vision. Given the 
fundamental place of these ways of life within the 
political consciousness, however, such a shift should be
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rather existentially disturbing. Consequently, ways of 
life may find some way to be a little less passive, a 
little more defensive. A mechanism for this self defense 
is possible if ways of life exist in narrative form.
Stories not only can recognize, they actively define and 
create a place for deviance. In this way, entire classes 
of human activity can be relegated to the marginal state of 
'exception' and thereby not generally offer a threat to the 
core narrative of the political consciousness.
An image of the importance of the narrative form to a 
self-organized belief system is beginning to emerge. 
Narrative can accommodate a great deal of complexity. The 
form can structure a tremendous amount of information in 
such a way that each element provides context for all of 
the others. This internal complexity creates a great deal 
of external variation. It has also been shown that the 
story is able to maintain the systems history, be that 
history unique and personal, or shared and collective. To 
this point, however, narrative has only been considered as 
a form or structure; this has been done to simplify the 
discussion. But narratives are not rigid entities. They 
are in fact processes as well as the foundational unit of a 
complex of processes which may well generate the 
organization of systems of political beliefs.
Narratives as dynamic entities incorporate a process 
of unfolding and discovery. Whether being created, told,
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or heard, dramatic tension in search of resolution is at 
the heart of the power of narrative. They flow from a set 
of initial conditions (a beginning) through particular 
situations (a middle) to a conclusion (an end). And the 
conclusion may well become part of the initial conditions 
for another story. Each story is not only*a process but in 
the process of breeding other stories.
Furthermore, stories do not only grow from the 
conclusions of other stories, but may evolve as complex 
nests of stories. A group of narratives may only have 
meaning within the context of a larger story. In other 
words, narratives can exist at various levels of 
abstraction. Here, then, is an indication of the 
importance of myths within cognition. Myths function as 
meta-narratives providing a cosmological context for more 
mundane narratives (Auerbach 1953). Greek tragedies and 
epics would probably not have been created outside of the 
context of ancient notions of the relationships between 
gods, mankind, and society. The same is true of Abraham's 
sacrifice of Isaac outside the more general history of the 
relationship of Yahweh and his people. Or to offer an 
example closer to home, the "invisible hand" is clearly a 
product of an "Enlightened" mentality.
Stories can also serve as the interpretive bases of 
other stories. In recent years, the importance of personal 
histories in various approaches to literary analysis has
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also become clear. Stories of sexual oppression, for 
example, have become the foundation for feminist literary 
criticism. This point is crucial in an exploration of the 
political belief system. The stories of the individual 
system must provide standards of evaluation of external 
world, particularly of policy opinions; stories such as the 
desert heuristic generally do serve this function.
Further, narratives are rationally coherent but not 
logically deterministic. Any story may develop in a 
variety of different directions all consistent with its own 
past and evolving circumstances. Numerous conclusions are 
often consistent with a single set of circumstances (For an 
explicit example of this general possibility see Fowles 
1969). This is an important element of the challenge and 
response dynamics of any self-organized system.
Another aspect of narrative which makes them likely 
foundations of self-organized cognition is that they allow 
for increases, even sudden and dramatic increases, in 
complexity. New information and experiences can be 
assimilated into existing stories without changing their 
fundamental nature. The narrative is broadened to 
integrate new discoveries with old. This does not imply 
that any experience can be made to fit within the context 
of any narrative; stories may need to abandoned or 
replaced. Eventually, deviance may become the rule and 
something like the typology of surprise will apply. The
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implication is, however, that there is no internal limit to 
the complexity which can be incorporated by the narrative 
process. In this way, narrative processes may be common to 
belief systems of people at any point on the levels of 
conceptualization scale; irregularity is not a sign of 
arbitrariness.
However, though a narrative based belief system is 
subject to change, it is not ephemeral. The other argument 
for the importance of narratives within the political 
belief system is their stability. The organizing principle 
of any self-organized system must provide for states of 
temporary equilibrium; this is how they are recognized as 
organized (Scott 1989, 9) . Stories can indeed exist as 
finished products until the environment requires them to 
respond to new challenges. In fact, this approach suggests 
a reality closer to that described by Thompson, Ellis, and 
Wildavsky; one in which the dualism between stability and 
change should be abandoned altogether: "a theory of change 
must also be a theory of stability... this dualism obscures 
the enormous amount of change that is required to secure 
stability" (1990, 22). A myth based theory of belief 
system is a theory of stability and change. In order to 
express these aspects of narrative, a new term will be used 
throughout the remainder of this dissertation. Narrative 
will be referred to as a form/process indicating the entire 
complex of mental activity which has been described here.
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Summarizing the observations of the previous two chapters 
will bring together the elements of the theory of myth 
based self-organized belief systems. Attribution research 
presents some evidence of the presence of stories in 
political reasoning and policy evaluation. Recognizing the 
hierarchical arrangement of belief systems, I suggested the 
importance of core narratives. Chapter three demonstrated 
that the social science concept most similar to core 
narrative, myth, is indeed theoretically compatible with 
conventional notions of belief system. Having suggested 
the possibility of myth based beliefs, I inquired into the 
nature of system as it pertains to political opinions. It 
was argued on the grounds of previous observation that 
systems of political belief display the properties of self­
organization. And within this type of system, narrative is 
at the heart of its dynamic processes.
As it has been developed thus far, the theory is 
perhaps best conceptualized as one in which the belief 
system consists of narrative layers. At the bottom of each 
individual belief system is a myth which is also the 
foundation of the belief systems of most people in a 
society. The second layer consists of somewhat less 
abstract narratives which are shared with a substantial 
subset of the society. Something like ideology may exist 
at this level. Movement up through these layers is 
movement through stories which become more concrete and
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more unique to the individual. At the top of the scale are 
purely personal experiences which have influenced the 
persons attitudes.
This image depicts how myth functions as a foundation 
for both the individual and the mass belief system: 
individuals are integrated into societies by myths. As 
also revealed by this representation, the theory can 
explain similarities and differences between individuals. 
Since each individual belief system has common and unique 
elements, a tremendous degree of variation in how policy 
opinions cluster together is expected. The power of the 
theory lies in the fact that this variation is explained as 
the product of various narratives, not as a result of 
different reasoning processes or of irrationality.
Other factors of myth based belief systems, however, 
are not captured by the layer image. One factor is the 
importance of context. Though a myth may be a common 
element within many belief systems, its role in any 
individual belief system will be influenced by other 
elements of the belief system. For example, one's 
understanding of liberalism will be influenced by personal 
encounters with society, and interpretations of encounters 
with society will be influenced by liberalism. Thus, as is 
typical of self-organized systems, the belief system is 
expected to be greater than the sum of various narrative 
elements.
A second factor not included is time. Because myths 
and other cognitive narratives are part and parcel to 
empirical experience, any or all aspects of the belief 
system might change as a consequence of daily encounters 
with the world. Individual elements of the belief system 
may even evolve as a product of reevaluation within the 
context of other elements. However, though a myth-based 
belief system is subject to change, they are not ephemeral. 
The other argument for the importance of narratives within 
the political belief system is their stability. Thus the 
image described here is a useful picture of a belief system 
but only at a particular point in time.
CHAPTER IV 
THE LITERATURE RECONSIDERED
Though a fairly elaborate conceptualization of systems 
of political belief has now been developed, one of the 
major objectives of this dissertation has not been 
achieved: the proposition made in the introduction that 
this theory resolves the anomalies of previous research 
(Bennett 1977) has yet to be supported. Though this 
literature has been cited as support for the current 
theory, the observations of others have been 
unsystematically cited as needed. Following a Lakatosian 
vision of scientific progress, the theory has been 
constructed from a large number of observations. However, 
there has been no systematic analysis of the relationship 
between theoretical approaches. This chapter fashions an 
answer to the question of integration of previous theories.
Beyond demonstrating theoretical linkages, this 
chapter will also serve another purpose. As Thompson and 
his colleagues have pointed out, developing theory is not 
sufficient, communicating it effectively is also essential. 
To this end, it is important to understand how the present 
theory is an addition to, and not a radical break from, 
previous ones (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1991, 103). 
Consequently, careful consideration of stability and change 
in theoretical development should clarify the issues which 
have been raised in this dissertation.
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This goal establishes the method of procedure. Each 
of the theoretical frameworks for the study of belief 
systems presented in chapter one must again be considered 
independently. The interest here, however, will be in 
their general characteristics, not in subtle arguments of 
definition and measurement. Each can then be compared to 
the theory of myth based belief systems.
The first theory to be discussed is political culture, in 
part because of its apparent similarity to myth. In the 
example of a myth discussed in chapter two, I suggested 
that liberalism, usually described as the American culture, 
actually exists and functions as a myth. It is important, 
therefore, to understand the similarities and differences 
between the concepts.
In general, the theory of myth based belief systems 
adds to the concept of culture a form/process, namely 
narrative. As Devine (1972) points out, the place where 
culture lives is in the minds of individuals; thus, culture 
is understood to be comprised of elements of cognition.
For reasons outlined above, we can expect these elements to 
be held together by stories. The important elements 
themselves: identity, rules, symbols, and beliefs, are 
expected to be the same for both theories.
Further comparison of the two theories must focus on 
the Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky (1991) treatment of
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cultural theory. Prior to this work, a host of limitations 
could be cited regarding political culture: its inability 
to explain change and its failure to incorporate 
experience, depending instead on a more purely sociological 
explanation of culture's origin and communication.
However, as has been seen above, the most recent 
exploration of this subject has made great strides in 
overcoming these limitations. This theory of political 
culture integrates reason and affect, stability and change, 
experience and socialization.
Despite these advances, the most limiting element of 
this theory is in fact the result of its dualistic 
foundation. Cultural Theory argues for the existence of 
exactly five ways of life. The number five is derived from 
an initial schematic borrowed from Mary Douglas. This 
schematic consists of two intersecting dimensions of social 
arrangement. One of them is the "Grid" dimension which 
"denotes the degree to which an individual's life is 
circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions" (5). At 
opposite ends of this dimension are social control and 
autonomy. The other of the two dimensions is equally 
dualistic. Implied in this picture is the notion that 
ideas such as autonomy and social control have meaning in 
and of themselves; social scientific meanings which hold 
true regardless of context. The theoretical limitation of 
this view can be demonstrated with an example. Consider
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the placement of zoon politicon: the belief that human 
beings are political animals who find true freedom and 
fulfillment only within the confines of their fellow 
creatures. Such a vision of humanity clouds the 
distinction between autonomy and social control.
In contrast, consider the theory proposed in this 
dissertation which suggests that the only thing permanent 
is the narrative form/process. As the term is described 
above, one role of myth is precisely the defining of terms 
like autonomy and social control. Thus zoon politicon is 
seen as the foundation of an exemplary core narrative on 
which social relations can be described and prescribed.
The theory of myth based political beliefs, then, may be 
less neat in its predictions but is more powerful, 
explaining more variation with a more parsimonious theory.
In this light, a point made above can be expanded. 
Myths are more subtle and adaptable than are ways of life. 
Indeed ways of life are not themselves adaptable at all; 
people move between possibilities, but the possibilities 
are fixed. Thus the importance of the typology of 
surprise, of sudden jumps, can again be questioned. Not 
only does the narrative form/process incorporate deviance, 
the malleability of narratives themselves provides a more 
satisfying integration of stability and change.
In pointing out these considerations, however, it is 
important not to overlook the contribution which the
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political culture literature makes to understanding the 
role of myths in political beliefs. Myths do provide a 
mental map of the world, they do define goals and 
preferences, and they do influence perceptions and social 
interaction. Thus pointing out the importance of myths 
does not replace the concept of culture but improves upon 
it by giving it more substance.
The next step is a closer look at the relationship between
myth and ideology. As Halpern (1961) provides an excellent
treatment of precisely this question, this discussion
begins with his conclusions about similarities and
differences between the concepts. This will be followed by
a discussion of the degree to which observations by
political scientists studying belief systems are consistent
with Halpern's explication.
Halpern begins with an exploration of the common
ground of myth and ideology, as they refer to such similar
phenomena, and then discusses the factors which distinguish
them from each other. Both terms imply "generally though
tacitly understood principles of historical knowledge"
(129). Going on to expand on this observation, Halpern
argues that both terms are historical in two senses:
"Myths" and "ideologies" are major and not 
trivial concretions of the symbols accumulated in 
culture over generations; that is, by definition, 
they weigh enough in the balance of history to be 
remembered and to exert their effects from one 
generation to the next. Also, "ideology"
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necessarily implies "other ideologies" with which 
it is in dynamic relations; and the same is true, 
in its own way, of "myth" (131) .
However, myth and ideology differ in both origin and
function. Myths have their origin in experience which is
then distorted by prelogical thought processes.
Ideologies, in contrast, arise from "particular situations
of social conflict or competition" (135). Other myths,
then, are understood to be myths of people at other times
and in other places while other ideologies can exist for
people in the same time and place but who are in
competition for social goods (136). Just as all opposites
are fundamentally the same thing, black and white are both
colors, polar ideologies should share a common myth
foundation. Halpern summarizes these findings:
1) The study of myths is the study of the origin 
of beliefs out of historical experience. The 
study of ideology is a study of the molding of 
beliefs by social situations. 2) The social 
function of myth is to bind together social 
groups as wholes or, in other words, to establish 
a social consensus. The social function of 
ideology is to segregate and serve special 
interests within societies in competition of 
debate (137) .
Several points can now be made by examining belief 
system research in this light. Many of the observations 
made by Converse and his followers indicate the validity of 
Halpern's arguments.
The classic ideological approach to the study of 
political belief requires the translation of an ideology 
into specific issue positions. This step is not itself a
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problem; the analyst can specify that one group of people 
in a given situation should have these interests and 
another group another set. One particular cluster of 
opinions can be identified as a manifestation of a 
1 conservative" ideology and another as "liberal." The 
meaning of a continuum between the two, however, is 
problematic. Consider two hypothetical individuals, for 
example, one is "liberal" on three issues and 
"conservative" on three issues. The other individual holds 
the exact opposite views being "liberal" on the three 
issues on which the first is "conservative" and vise versa. 
The ideology continuum fails to distinguish between these 
two individuals. The same is true of any internal point on 
the continuum.
A more sophisticated view of the phenomena arises when 
it is recognized that multiple ideologies may be built upon 
a single myth foundation. What is important is the 
relative position of groups within the society regarding 
various social goods. And as policies deal with 
distribution of social goods, numerous opinion clusters are 
possible. From this point of view, "liberal" may be an 
ideology, and "conservative" its logical opposite, but the 
two individuals described above may also exemplify 
ideologies.
In the ideology school of belief system research, it 
is generally accepted that socialization is the origin of
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ideology. Halpern, however, has clarified the importance 
of experience and situation in addition to socialization. 
Not only does this explain greater ideological variation, 
it gives a clue as to why ideological reasoning, as 
described by Converse and his followers, has proven to be 
peculiar to elites. Consider in isolation the two ends of 
the scale. As it happens both ends of the scale consist 
primarily of answers to the question "what should elites do 
for non elites, i.e. for women, for minorities, for the 
poor, for those who need education?" In Halpern's 
language, there is a tremendous similarity of situation in 
the very question. Both ideologies evidence an elite 
perspective; both "liberals" and "conservatives" see the 
fundamental political relationship in our society as the 
one between elites and the masses. It does not seem such a 
surprise, then, that this way of thinking is foreign to the 
experience and. situation of most Americans.
What is not foreign to the experience of these and 
most other Americans is the myth of liberalism. Chapter 
two argued that liberalism may function as a myth and that 
there is substantial evidence of its import throughout 
American political history. Consequently, the question 
arises, "Is their evidence that liberalism, an example of 
myth, and "liberal" and "conservative," examples of polar 
ideologies, co-exist as Halpern predicts they would?"
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If Halpern is correct, there should be evidence 
indicating that liberalism is a common foundation for these 
two ideologies; liberalism the myth should be the 
prelogical expression of experience which unites both 
groups of people, while the ideologies divide people 
according to their situation within society. As it 
happens, McClosky and Zaller (1984) demonstrate the former, 
labeling the values which are common to most elites 
"ethos". (Ethos relates to myth just as culture does.
Ethos and myth are not completely different entities, myth 
simply implies a form/process in which the ethos exists in 
the minds of individuals.) And Shingles (1989) 
demonstrates the differences of situation among elites 
labeling them high class and high status.
The importance of myths within individual and 
collective belief systems raises a question about myth 
conflict in a heterogeneous society such as ours.
According to the literature on myth, it may be difficult 
for people with different core narratives to communicate 
and find compromises. Conflict between myths, therefore, 
may become a defining characteristic of fundamental 
political struggles within a society. In the American 
context, the liberal myth does not account for a master 
slave relationship. And if the master slave relationship 
has remained a myth within the black community, there is 
reason to believe that racial issues would become central
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to political discourse and belief systems. Carmines and 
Stimson (1982) demonstrate that this is exactly what 
happened in the early 1960s. If ideological conflict is 
conflict between the two poles of a single dimension, race 
conflict in our society has been conflict between 
dimensions. Policies such as affirmative-action hiring 
quotas, which are usually inconsistent with the myth of 
liberalism in almost any ideological form, are indications 
of the nature of this conflict.
In contrast to the concept of ideology based belief 
systems, however, the theory of myth based belief system 
does not establish a single standard for judging rational 
cohesion. Most of the ideology research begins with 
assumptions about "what goes with what." Specifically, the 
liberal-conservative continuum is its foundation. On this 
point, a myth framework is more in keeping with the 
observations of Grafstein (1990) and Brown (1970) who have 
identified problems with any belief in rational coherence 
in and of itself.
Finally, it is important to consider the general 
observations on political reasoning made by both Nie and 
Andersen (1974) and Carmines and Stimson (1982).
Regardless of how much increase in liberal-conservative 
reasoning there may have been in the early 1960s, the main 
points of both of these pieces of research are consistent 
with the theory of myth based belief systems. Due to its
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narrative form/process, public opinion should be somewhat 
responsive both to events and to elite leadership. Only- 
sudden and radical change would be rare.
Despite the insights of Halpern and their obvious 
utility in this analysis, it is important not to overstate 
the case. Myth, Halpern argues, is a product of experience 
and ideology a consequence of situation. But is not any 
understanding of situation dependent on the experiences 
which it generates? Furthermore, there is reason to 
believe that the narrative form/process is an essential 
element of political reasoning throughout the entire 
cognitive hierarchy, from myth to policy position. Thus 
while myth may consist of a prelogical expression, it 
should not be seen as more or less rational than ideology. 
Nevertheless, myth and ideology are useful labels of two 
levels of the hierarchy of systems of political belief, 
and there is ample evidence that they can be analytically 
distinguished.
The core values literature which suggests a hierarchical 
structure for systems of political belief was one of the 
foundations for the initial proposition that myth might be 
relevant to this topic. And throughout the dissertation an 
image of hierarchy has been maintained. Consequently, the 
two theories are certainly compatible. Examining this
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compatibility more closely, however, will demonstrate the 
superiority of recognizing the importance of narratives.
Recall, first, the Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) argument 
that "a paucity of information does not impede structure 
and consistency, it motivates the development and 
employment of structure" (1114). It is also clear that 
simplification of the external world is one of the prime 
functions of myth, and that the narrative form generally is 
adept at dealing with missing information. Thus on the 
issue of handling complexity, these are two complimentary 
explanations offering a structure and a form/process.
The core values literature, however, leaves us with 
some questions. The most important of these regards the 
actual existence of the values in individual cognition.
Are isolated, abstract concepts, such as freedom, the 
foundational elements of our political reasoning and 
evaluations? Or do these values exist in some context?
One argument that myths provide the context for core values 
can be drawn directly from the observations of Hurwitz and 
Peffley. A hierarchy of values is certainly a more simple 
arrangement than an egalitarian plane of values, but a 
hierarchy of values held together by narratives is more 
simple still. Recall that narrative is the form in which 
we encounter the social world; memory and evaluation, then, 
should be facilitated by internalizing this form. Concepts 
like freedom must have meaning, stories about heros
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struggling for liberation from oppressors, for example, 
give them meaning.
The theory of myth based belief systems also 
incorporates observations regarding the importance of 
religious beliefs. In this language, liberalism and 
Christianity are simply two different meta-narratives which 
provide meaning and prescription for social interaction.
It has also been suggested that the narratives of political 
reasoning are not isolated entities but a complex of 
interrelated elements. Consequently, religious values, 
when they are adhered to by individuals, should be integral 
factors in a system of political belief.
It was observed in the review of the literature in 
chapter one that one of the major contributions of the core 
values research to the study of belief systems was an 
integration of sociological and psychological approaches.
A theory built on myth maintains this important linkage. 
Myths maintain order and consistency at both the individual 
and collective level. Thus this theory improves upon its 
predecessor without sacrificing the insights gained from 
core values analysis.
In chapter one, it was also demonstrated that the core 
values literature and the social group explanations are not 
mutually exclusive. This became particularly apparent in 
studies of religious groups (Leege and Welch 1989; Wald, 
Owen, and Hill 1990) where shared values were seen as
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contributing to group identity and to evaluations of 
others. There is now reason to believe that values are 
held and shared in narrative form and that groups are often 
the characters in these stories.
Myth's role in social group identity is one of 
definition. Just as myths describe the nature of social 
relationships such as control and autonomy, so too do they 
define "who" it is that is relating. As described by those 
who have studied them closely, myths unite people of common 
experience (Halpern 1961; Geertz 1973). This is so because 
common experience is rendered by common myths. Thus myths 
are responsible for the very experience of group identity. 
If there were no shared account of shared bits of reality, 
there would be no group.
It has also been pointed out that the narrative 
form/process is capable of containing all of the factors of 
experience within itself. Thus, myths would be able to 
portray not only the groups of which we are members but 
also the "other" groups. Furthermore, expectations about 
interaction between the groups would be included in the 
plot of the myth. For example, the same myth which defines 
Americans for themselves may well define the Russians or 
some other enemies; enemies can be seen as simply the 
opposite of whatever we think we are. In making these 
definitions, a myth would also entail the perceived 
relationship between the two. In this way, the theory of
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myth based belief systems establishes a common foundation 
for both the psychological identity and the attribution 
phenomena which have been described and observed.
As a rule the proposed importance of myths provides a 
somewhat broader theoretical perspective on the belief 
system phenomenon than either the group identity or the 
attribution approach. Consequently, previous analysis 
guided by either of these approaches is valid despite the 
proposed change. The following examples demonstrate how a 
few previous studies are consistent with a myth framework.
The work of Conover (1980) and Sigelman and Knight 
(1985) indicates that individuals are evaluated in the same 
way as policies, that is by attribution of characteristics. 
This observation is consistent with expectations as 
individuals play the same role in the narrative 
form/process as do groups of them. The factors which 
emerge in the Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth (1991) analysis 
may well indicate the existence of several myths within 
American society. Though factors do not necessarily reveal 
the way any individual actually thinks, the strength of 
these factors indicate some shared perceptions which unite 
and divide American society. Finally, the work of Allen, 
Dawson, and Brown (1989) is consistent with expectations 
regarding myth maintenance. Those who are more closely 
tied to information coming from the group maintain closer 
identity with the group.
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These few examples are fairly diverse in their 
interests and in their theoretical approaches.
Nevertheless, they are all comprehensible by looking at the 
underlying stories they reveal. In this way, they 
demonstrate the integrative capacities of the proposed 
theory.
This search for an integrated theory began with the 
observation that the black box approach of schema left many 
questions unanswered. Subsequently, it was argued that 
belief systems display the characteristics of self­
organization which gives further cause to be suspicious of 
the black box approach. By focusing on the internal 
dynamics of belief systems, an integrative theory has been 
developed. Like schema theory, myth and the narrative 
form/process bring together psychological factors such as 
group identity, sociological factors like shared historical 
experience, a hierarchical structure, and the importance of 
memory in the interpretation of reality. But, as has been 
seen, the theory of myth based belief systems goes beyond 
these and provides answers to questions of internal 
coordination and evolution.
As the primary purpose of this dissertation has been 
to respond to Bennett's call for a "general, integrative, 
theory of mass beliefs" (1977, 473), one final observation 
should be made. It now appears that the earlier theories 
from which the present one has been constructed were not as
"divergent" as Bennett suggests. From the perspective of 
myth and the narrative form/process, these other approaches 
differ only in emphasis. They are not contradictory but 
various pieces of a larger picture.
CHAPTER V 
DATA COLLECTION
Chapters two and three of this dissertation blend 
together several concepts. Traditional notions of 
political belief system are combined with the concept of 
myth, the general narrative form, and the science of self­
organization. When considered together, these elements 
create a theory which is applicable to many aspects of 
political reasoning. Chapter four demonstrates that this 
theory does not supplant previous ones but is consistent 
with them. Being consistent with previous theories, the 
theory of myth based belief systems is consistent with most 
of the empirical findings derived from them. This is not 
to suggest that previous investigations prove the validity 
of this theory, but rather that they might have, but do 
not, establish evidence against various aspects of the 
theory. To the extent that previous empirical research is 
relevant to the proposed theory at all, however, it is only 
relevant to certain peripheral factors.
To conclude this dissertation, therefore, it is 
important to include an exploration of the more central 
elements of the theory as they are evident in real people. 
The process of bringing together abstract ideas has proven 
beneficial and enlightening. However, as with myth, a 
theory must constantly be compared to empirical experience. 
This is the purpose of the next two chapters.
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For reasons discussed below, however, existing data 
sets are insufficient for exploring the myth based belief 
system. This chapter lays out the method used to collect a 
new data set, one which is guided by and more appropriate 
to this theory. The following chapter consists of the 
analysis of this information. This analysis should not be
interpreted as hypothesis testing, but might more
accurately be described as a presentation of evidence and 
examples.
The exploration of the central elements of a theory of 
myth based belief systems requires "thick" data. One of 
the predictions which can be drawn from the theory 
developed in this dissertation is that the context in which 
political opinions exist is very important. This theory 
places more emphasis on context than most previous ones due
to the expected importance of system history and
development. Context can include the individual's personal 
experience as it relates to an opinion, the opinions of 
others, the values of the society, and many other factors. 
In the process of political evaluation, these contextual 
factors contribute to an image of "what is at stake"
(Zaller 1991), what is to be gained or lost if an issue is 
decided a certain way or if a particular individual is 
elected: lives, freedom, money, peace, order, etc.
As previous theories have not emphasized the 
importance of context, the data collection guided by these
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theories has also been incomplete. An assumption made in 
most mass surveys is that the authors and the analysts of 
the survey know the answers to questions like what is at 
stake in a particular issue. Consequently, most surveys 
inquire only about where a person stands on a scale. This 
is a very useful technique for comparing people to each 
other on an issue. However, exploring rational coherence 
of belief systems using such data is problematic. For 
example, if an analyst assumes that a person who is "pro- 
choice" on abortion is interested in the right to privacy, 
when in fact that person is primarily concerned about birth 
rates among the poor, it will be very difficult to explain 
how this opinion is rationally related to others. By 
contrast, an examination of that person's own explanation 
of the opinion may well reveal a rational foundation for 
what appears to be a wildly irregular pattern of belief.
And if belief systems are self-organized, this is exactly 
the expectation; an examination of the dynamics of opinion 
formation is essential. To conclude, understanding 
political opinions requires understanding the context in 
which those opinions exist, and understanding the latter 
requires inquiry, not assumption. The only way to know why 
people think what they think is to ask them why.
Thus, a survey was designed specifically for this 
dissertation. The development of the instrument was guided 
by the following principles: 1) A fairly broad picture of
the respondent's belief system was a goal of the survey. 
Consequently, a variety of political elements were 
considered. The elements included in this survey are a) 
political persons, i.e., the recent presidential 
candidates, b) contemporary political issues, and c) the 
nature of American government itself, i.e., its role in and 
responsiveness to society. 2) The respondents were offered 
as much opportunity as possible to express their own 
priorities. What an individual thinks is important reveals 
a great deal about that person's fundamental view of 
society and politics. This survey allows this type of 
information to be revealed which makes analysis of the 
structure of the overall belief system possible. 3) In 
order to explore form of political reasoning and the 
context in which opinions exist, discursive data is 
necessary. The researcher should not impose the reasoning 
behind holding a particular belief. To this end, 
respondents were given opportunities to explain their own 
attitudes in their own terms. 4) The theory of myth based 
belief systems proposed above also suggests the importance 
of experience. Both personal and collective/historical 
experience may be important. The latter is expected to be 
of particular relevance at the more abstract level of myth. 
Therefore, the survey concludes with an inquiry into these 
factors. (See appendix A for complete instrument.)
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The sample for such an instrument is necessarily small 
and, therefore, is not a representative slice of the 
American population as a whole. Consequently, the method 
of selecting respondents and the composition of the 
resulting sample may have critical effects on the 
information collected by the instrument. Thus, a detailed 
discussion of these issues is appropriate.
One of the first factors considered in choosing 
respondents was the indications of previous research that 
there is a substantial portion of the population with 
almost no attitudes of a type that political scientists 
would consider political. Of course this could be the 
result of foreign notions about the locus of important 
power relationships; that is, there could be ideas about 
American politics which conventionally trained political 
scientists do not recognize as such. This possibility, 
however, is theoretically distinct from the proposed theory 
regarding how ideas fit together. In an effort to avoid 
trying to understand both what political ideas people do 
have, along with how those ideas fit together, in a single, 
preliminary survey, this survey concentrates only on ideas 
and opinions of the conventional sort, that is, those 
issues which are the concern of most contemporary political 
rhetoric and of most public opinion surveys.
This limitation in scope of the instrument makes a 
limitation in the potential respondent population
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necessary. Previous research indicates that individuals on 
the higher end of the levels of conceptualization scale are 
more likely to have opinions on these issues.
Consequently, minimum standards of formal education and 
political information were set for respondents. A high 
school degree and some higher education was set as the 
education minimum, and completion of at least one college 
level political science course was the minimum information 
requirement. For purely logistical reasons, the population 
from which the sample was taken was students at Louisiana 
State University.
In soliciting volunteers, an effort was made to 
achieve some variation in the sample. Of particular 
importance was racial variation. The theory of myth based 
belief systems leads to the expectation that variation in 
experience results in variation in political beliefs. 
Throughout the history of the United States, the most stark 
variation in the common experience of social groups has 
been that between whites and blacks. If there is contrast 
between myths anywhere in American political belief 
systems, it should be readily apparent here. Also of 
theoretical interest are religious differences. Particular 
individuals were recruited with these factors in mind.
Participants were selected by personal contact. In 
most cases, they were contacted individually by myself or a 
colleague. Each was asked if he or she would mind
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participating in an interview on their political opinions. 
Potential respondents were told that the interview would 
take about an hour of their time and that the interviews 
were being conducted as part of a Ph.D. dissertation 
project. A second method of recruitment was via a general 
announcement to a political science class providing the 
same information and requesting participants. In neither 
method was there any mention of a reward. None of the 
students were in a class of mine at the time of the request 
or of the interviews, so no grading advantage should have 
been expected in any case. Each individual was contacted a 
second time to set up a precise time and place for the 
interview. Two potential respondents who had volunteered 
could not be scheduled and were not interviewed. No 
respondents who were scheduled, however, missed the 
appointment.
These selection procedures resulted in thirteen 
respondents. Of these, four were black and nine were 
white. There were four women and nine men. Three were 
over the age of 25, ranging in age from 3 0 to 65, with the 
remainder being between the ages of 18 and 25. All of them 
met the minimum education and information requirements. 
Eight of the respondents were recruited by individual 
request while five responded to a general class 
announcement. It is interesting to note that this last 
group of five included all three of the interviewees who
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were over the age of 25. It should also be noted that the 
sample can be described generally as "highly interested in 
politics." Several of them far exceeded the minimum 
political information requirement having taken numerous 
political science classes and, in some cases, been very 
active in political campaigns. In this and in their 
education, they are rather an elite sample when compared to 
Americans generally.
The interviews themselves were conducted between 
December of 1992 and March of 1993. Each was conducted 
individually in a private room in an academic building 
(Stubbs Hall) on the LSU campus. Interviews were scheduled 
with plenty of time in between them such that the 
interviewees were not required to wait. I was prepared and 
waiting for each of them so that the interview began as 
soon as possible. To my knowledge, none of the respondents 
knew each other, nor was there any interaction between 
them. In one case, a respondent was accompanied by a 
friend who also sat in the room during the interview.
There was no verbal communication between the two during 
the interview however.
All of the interviews were conducted by me in a face 
to face position, in most cases across a table or desk, and 
in a conversational tone. After a brief discussion of a 
greeting nature, all of the respondents but one were asked 
if they objected to the interview being taped. All of them
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said no. (In at least two cases, however, there did seem 
to be some anxiety on the part of the respondent, perhaps 
partially as a consequence of being recorded.) Except in 
the one case that was not recorded, very few or no notes 
were taken during the interview so as to avoid drawing 
attention to particular responses. And in that one case, 
notes were being written continuously which also should 
have avoided drawing attention to any particular answers.
After the tape recorder was turned on, the interviews 
began with some introductory remarks. (appendix B) The 
main purpose of these remarks was to remove as much of the 
artificiality and inequality of an interview as possible.
To this end, questions and comments about the interview as 
it progressed were encouraged, and the reasons for the 
interview were explained. These comments were also 
intended to set the tone and pace for the interview.
After responding to any questions the participant had 
about the interview, each was asked to sign a permission 
slip. (appendix C) This permission was obtained pursuant 
to the approval agreement granted by the Committee on the 
Use of Humans and Animals as Research Subjects at Louisiana 
State University. (Copies of the application for approval 
as well as the letter granting approval are available from 
the author.) None of the respondents declined to sign the 
form, though one did reiterate his or her interest in 
remaining anonymous several times.
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The general goals of the survey instrument are set out 
above. A few additional comments about the instrument and 
the interviews, however, should be noted.
There was a great deal of variation in the 
expressiveness of the respondents; interview length ranged 
from 30 to 75 minutes. Most were at the low end of this 
range. The interviews did not include a great deal of 
effort to get respondents to go into more detail. It 
seemed most useful to let them talk when they had something 
they wanted to say and stop when they did not want to go 
on. In nearly all cases, this produced a large number of 
fairly brief responses with a few substantial ones offered 
by each individual. This information itself revealed a 
great deal about the centrality of certain issues as well 
as the centrality of politics generally in the person's 
lif e .
The part of the interview I considered to be the 
easiest was placed first. This was the discussion of the 
recent presidential election. This did prove to be an item 
that the respondents were comfortable discussing. All 
respondents had voted in the 1992 election and had very 
solid reasons for doing so. Further, they did not seem to 
have a problem expressing what they thought an American 
president's priorities should be. All of them appeared to 
have had similar discussions before and could express their 
ideas.
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The discussion of particular issues was expected to be 
and proved to be more difficult for some of them. In some 
cases, issues came up which the respondent seemed not to 
have previously considered. In many instances, respondents 
were noticeably unsure of themselves. More generally, the 
difference in the logic of an interview versus the logic of 
a normal conversation was also apparent. Moving from one 
topic to the next according to my discretion rather than 
letting the discussion evolve proved to be an aggressive 
and invasive method. Respondents were never sure when they 
were to be finished with one issue and had no way to 
prepare for what came next. The inequality between the 
interviewer and the interviewee was apparent. Despite all 
efforts to the contrary, this approach truncated the normal 
reasoning process, and responses, even on these open ended 
questions, are directly contaminated by the method.
As a rule, racial and gender differences between the 
interviewer and the respondents did not seem to have much 
impact. Black respondents and women seemed very open about 
race and gender issues. Black students in particular 
seemed to have given a great deal of thought to differences 
between the races in American society and were very willing 
to discuss their conclusions. On the other hand, either 
because they had not thought about it much or for some 
other reason, white respondents were often uncomfortable 
discussing racial issues. Generally, the issue being
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discussed seemed to have more impact on a respondents' 
willingness to talk about it than characteristics of the 
respondent.
The rational coherence of individual systems of 
political belief has proven to be an elusive phenomena. It 
is, however, one of the main goals of belief system 
research. By integrating the elements structure, 
form/process, and sources of content, the theory of myth 
based belief systems offers a more complete explanation of 
this coherence than any other single theory. In doing so, 
it provides the analyst of public opinion with a set of 
clues or expectations which may lead to finding rational 
coherence where none was visible before. It also suggests 
the nature of the information which is needed if coherence 
is to be evident. As described above, the intention of 
this survey is the collection of information appropriate to 
this task. Examination of the data collected in this 
survey is a search for coherence guided by the clues. They 
are:
1) Narrative elements should be prevalent in political 
reasoning. A narrative is evident when the respondent 
utilizes a character-plot form of discourse. This is in 
contrast to what might be considered more purely rational 
discourse in forms such as "if...then..." Public opinion 
research grounded in attribution theory has demonstrated 
the existence of the story in some specific political
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contexts. Beyond attribution type narratives, others may 
also be evident such as personal anecdotes; e.g., "I am in 
favor of gun control because my brother was shot by a thief 
with a cheap hand gun."
2) Such stories and beliefs should derive their 
authority within the belief system from a single more 
general vision of the nature of human beings, of 
government, and of their interaction, i.e., a myth. The 
various elements of the system should be rationally 
coherent within the context of this myth. It is very 
possible that the myth will be so firmly assumed that the 
respondent does not articulate it. A sensitive reading of 
the individual's complete pattern of beliefs as expressed 
in the survey may give the analyst insight into the nature 
of the myth however. If not, additional insight into the 
myth at the core of any individual's political beliefs may 
be aided by the next clue.
3) The particular stories of particular belief systems 
should be related to experience. Of importance here are 
the collective historical experiences of the social group; 
myths are not expected to change radically in response to 
personal experience. In this sample, then, evidence of 
similarities within racial groups and differences between 
them is expected.
4) As the coherence of systems of belief is not 
expected to be generated by causal relationships, a one-to-
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one relationship between myth and the more concrete 
elements of belief systems is not expected. Thus people 
who share a basic myth about American political 
relationships may have voted for different presidential 
candidates or evidence different patterns of policy 
opinions. Rather analysis must find that presidential and 
policy evaluations are reasonable within the context of a 
particular myth.
5) The myths and narratives of political cognition are 
not expected to exist or function as discreet packages.
The more appropriate metaphor is a web of interconnected 
parts with each part providing context for the others. 
Religious values, when present, have an important influence 
on political beliefs. Christianity in particular is known 
to be an important element of the opinions of both white 
and black Americans. Thus religious persons should be 
recognizably distinct from their secular counterparts. Of 
particular interest in this context is the interaction of 
religious myths with the dominant social myths of the two 
racial groups.
These interviews proved to be a very important 
addition to the dissertation. They provided examples which 
demonstrate the theory. As shall be seen in the next 
chapter, though the theory is generally supported by the 
data, some revision is necessary. Furthermore, some
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additional findings which are consistent with the theory 
but had not been anticipated can be added.
The limitations on the data, however, should be kept 
in mind. The respondents comprise an elite sample in terms 
of education, political information, and professional 
aspirations or accomplishments. Future research must 
attempt to escape this limitation. Also, as noted above, 
the interview artificially structures the data. It is in 
many ways exactly contradictory to the information 
suggested by the theory in that responses are abstracted 
from normal reasoning processes. As such, the validity of 
the information collected is dependent on the intentional 
effort of each respondent to overcome this artificiality 
and to try to answer each question as honestly as possible. 
I believe that these thirteen people did a remarkable job 
of trying to respond honestly, and consequently some very 
interesting results were obtained.
CHAPTER VI 
DATA ANALYSIS
The analysis of the data collected in the interviews 
will be presented in two parts. These two parts are 
roughly parallel to the material presented in chapters two 
and three. The first part explores political beliefs at 
the level of myth. As expected, respondents did not 
clearly articulate their fundamental views of human beings 
and social interaction. Taken collectively, however, 
certain common beliefs can be extracted from the data. 
Furthermore, there are indications that these common 
beliefs exhibit the characteristics of myth.
The second part of this chapter focuses on the 
reasoning process involved in the evaluation of issues. 
There are indications in the data that the character/plot 
form of reasoning is important at this more concrete level 
also. However, the layers of narrative structure described 
at the end of chapter four does not appear to be accurate. 
Rather, political reasoning seems to occur primarily at a 
fairly constant level. This level lies between the 
abstract myth and concrete facts learned from experience.
In its narrative structure and level of abstraction, the 
elements of this process are very similar to constructs 
which have been referred to as heuristics. These heuristics 
are the result of interpreting experience within the
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context of the shared myth and are the point at which 
rational coherence is most apparent.
Liberal ideals are essential elements of the political 
beliefs of the participants in these interviews. As used 
here, and as evidenced in the interviews, liberal ideals 
include primary interest in personal autonomy and economic 
prosperity. The importance of such ideals was certainly to 
be expected; as discussed previously, numerous earlier 
studies describe the importance of liberal beliefs in 
American politics generally and public opinion more 
specifically. The goal of the present study, however, is 
not simply to confirm the presence of liberalism, but to 
describe more fully its nature and function within a system 
of political beliefs. More to the point, the concern is 
with whether liberalism is accurately described as a myth.
The goal of the first part of this chapter is to argue 
that this is an accurate description according to the 
evidence which exists in the survey responses. This 
argument will proceed by presenting evidence which 
indicates that liberalism displays four important 
characteristics of myth: it is shared by and unites a group 
of people (Halpern 1961); it serves as a foundation for 
evaluation thereby uniting the descriptive and the 
prescriptive (Geertz 1973); it is comprised of characters 
and actions and therefor its nature is narrative
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(Blumenburg 1985); and it is historical in the sense that 
it survives through time (Halpern 1961).
However vividly respondents disagree on various issues, 
there was a foundation shared by all of them. Major 
elements of this foundation included the perceived 
importance of personal autonomy and economic matters. 
Evidence of this is seen in respondents' thoughts on what 
their priorities would be if they were president. This 
question was intended to ascertain ideas about what the 
respondent thought was most important. In addition to 
revealing personal priorities, comparing answers 
demonstrates that there is a great deal more similarity 
than difference between most of those surveyed on these 
fundamental beliefs.
The following examples are a list of first responses 
to the question:
economic issues
let roe v wade stand; court more liberal;
economic; too many people unemployed; no way we should 
import products and goods with so many Americans 
unemployed
protecting business from undue regulation 
disassemble some of the bureaucracy 
line item veto; too much pork 
A few of the respondents spoke primarily of education in 
response to this question. In all of these cases, however,
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this interest was also directly related to personal 
autonomy and economic concerns. The general belief was 
that education is the way to improve a person's 
competitiveness for jobs, thereby decreasing economic 
dependence on social programs and improving the country's 
competitiveness in the global economy. One student added 
to this discussion the idea that educated people were more 
able to be innovative and to create jobs not only by 
creating employment slots but by creating all together new 
industries.
Other respondents mentioned other issues, racial 
equality, for example, but there were no respondents who 
did not reveal, here or elsewhere, a fundamental belief in 
these liberal principles. Recall Halpern's (1961) 
discussion of myth; he points out that myths "bind together 
social groups as wholes or, in other words, to establish a 
social consensus" (137). If the participants in this 
survey are indicative of American society on this point, 
liberal ideas do bind social groups in this society 
together. The findings discussed above come from men and 
women, rich and poor students, blacks and whites, and the 
young and old. There appears to be a consensus on these 
values.
A second characteristic of myth is that it provides a 
descriptive image of the world which is then used as a 
foundation for evaluating what should be. As Geertz has
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observed, myths "are felt somehow to sum up, for those whom
they are resonant, what is known about the way the world
is, the quality of the emotional life it supports, and the
way one ought to behave while in it" (1973). Or, in the
words of Eliade: "the foremost function of myth is to
reveal the exemplary model for all human rights and
significant activities- diet or marriage, work or
education, art or wisdom" (1963, 8). In expressing their
own priorities, the students revealed their perceptions of
what is important in life. In expressing their views of
the presidential candidates, they revealed the process of
comparing the "is" to the "ought." The nature of this
process of evaluation will be discussed in detail below;
but the importance of liberal ideals in making choices in
the political world is clear in the respondents'
evaluations of the presidential candidates:
(Perot) had some strong points; approaching government 
with business sense
(Clinton won because) people sensed a state of 
doldrums and they wanted quick change; get economy 
revved up; there was a perception of recession and no 
economic gain
the way I look at things is the way Bush looks at 
things
(Perot's) business sense might could have helped 
economic problems
(Clinton was interested in) jobs in this country
(republicans) cater to the upper classes
(Bush) untrustworthy about the economy; people could 
see we were in a recession
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(voted for Bush because) economic issues superior to 
Clinton
(Bush lost because) family values are nice, but we 
live in a country with different individuals with 
their own views of morality...making family values 
center and economics a side issue is reversed 
priorities
(Bush) held views that appeal to my generation; 
government should not regulate too much;
(Clinton's) middle class tax cut was not legitimate
(liked Clinton because) he was from an economically 
disadvantaged state just like Louisiana so he will 
understand
republicans leaned more toward moral issues; democrats 
more towards concrete issues (e.g.) women's issues
(liked Bush because) worry less about social programs 
more about economic health of the country in terms of 
business
As these examples indicate, the same themes which are 
expressed in personal priorities are the principle ones 
used to evaluate presidential candidates. What is also 
clear, however, is that in the process of moving from basic 
beliefs to evaluations tremendous variation arises.
Personal autonomy and economic status were important to 
all, but there was disagreement on what actions should be 
taken to insure these values, and, therefore, on who is 
more likely to take the correct actions. This disagreement 
arises in part because of variation in perceptions of 
empirical circumstances, or what Halpern referred to as 
situation (1961), to be discussed in part two of this 
chapter. The point to be made here, however, is that
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liberal ideals display the second characteristic of a myth: 
they provide a standard for evaluation.
The third characteristic of myth which needs to be 
discussed is the form in which these shared standards of 
evaluation exist, i.e., narrative. In most traditional 
myths, the major character is a hero of some type, a moral 
exemplar. Often this hero possesses divine power (Eliade, 
1963). As Campbell describes it, the action in most all 
myths is a guest which requires separation of the hero from 
the community. Upon successful completion of the quest 
and the achievement of some knowledge or goal, the hero 
returns to the community (Campbell 1968). The story of the 
hero is told within the community because the actions and 
achievements of the hero are to become the ideals for human 
behavior within the society.
If liberalism is a myth, its narrative certainly does 
not fit into this traditional form. The participants in 
the survey did not discuss particular individuals who had 
divine power. They did not tell stories of separation and 
return. In fact, at the level of abstraction of the 
liberal ideals which have been discussed in this chapter, 
the respondents did not generally tell stories at all. In 
sum, it seems safe to conclude that the respondents did not 
view their fundamental political beliefs as comprising a 
myth. If asked, most of them certainly would have denied 
such a proposition. A more accurate description of their
129
own perceptions of their own beliefs may be "self-evident 
truths." The evidence for this interpretation is the 
absence of alternatives in the belief systems of these 
individuals. They did not discus various possible 
political ideals and settle on liberal ones; the liberal 
ones seem to be unchallenged. Consequently, they remain 
largely implicit and are not expressed in a coherent 
fashion.
It falls to the present analyst, therefore, to 
demonstrate that there .is. a narrative form which underlies 
the standards of evaluation discussed heretofore in this 
chapter. Such a demonstration requires looking for the 
characters, character traits, and plot which integrate 
liberalism into a solid foundation for evaluation of 
political action.
Examining political beliefs through a story lens, it 
appears that we are its only characters. There is no 
evidence in the survey responses of any belief in some 
human beings who are qualitatively different from everyone 
else; no discussion of "other" people whose lives are to be 
accepted as standards of behavior. Rather, most references 
were to "people" generally, or to classes of American 
citizens. These are a few examples of such references in 
political discussion:
if you choose not to that is your problem 
blacks blame whites as a group
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children are harmed by... 
people should have... 
once people have jobs they will... 
parents of white children... 
most women...
our government is exactly what we deserve 
...pull your own weight 
my generation... 
one man, one vote 
These and many similar phrases indicate that when Americans 
think about politics, they think in terms of Americans.
Beyond this observation, it is important to note that 
these phrases can be placed into two categories. The more 
important at the level of myth consists of the ones which 
refer to people universally. Such expressions reveal the 
belief that there are characteristics of all human beings. 
This fact along with the absence of any discussion of 
qualitative distinctions among people reveals a general 
belief in human equality. It constructing the foundational 
liberal narrative, this is a very important point. Unlike 
previous myths, there is no evidence of morally exemplary 
human beings to which everyone else is compared. This does 
not, however, imply that the vision of society which 
Americans hold is without people. We the people are 
ourselves the characters of our own foundational narrative.
The next question to be examined involves the nature 
of the characters in the story, in this case, American 
citizens themselves. The attribution literature reveals 
that people do attribute characteristics to various groups 
of people. To be an element of a liberal myth, however, a 
particular characteristic should be applied to most all 
people. The survey responses reveal that there is at least 
one characteristic of human nature which is contained in 
the liberal vision. The importance of economic concerns to 
the respondents has been discussed. There is also some 
indication, implicit in their comments, of a belief that 
economic or property concerns are of fundamental importance 
to all people, at least to all Americans. Discussion of 
economic issues dominated the interviews. Economic 
motivations were essential to the respondents' 
understanding of politics. Of particular importance to the 
respondents was the freedom to acquire property.
Evaluations of social and political relationships focused 
on whether they aided or interfered with this freedom. The 
examples given above reveal that for some, government 
regulation is interfering with this freedom, and for 
others, economic inequality and lack of education are the 
primary problems. For all of the respondents, however, the 
desire to be free to achieve economic prosperity was seen 
as an essential attribute of themselves and others and 
should be the goal of government action.
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Beyond characters and their motivations, the most 
defining element of narrative is action. It would be 
difficult to defend the position that liberalism is 
accurately described as a myth if free and equal American 
citizens who are driven by an interest in economic security 
did not do anything.
In their responses to the survey questions, however, 
participants expressed a great deal of action in their 
political beliefs: having, wanting, regulating, blaming, 
declining, increasing, teaching, changing, cutting, 
spending, learning, etc. The myth, however, requires an 
abstract and universal action; a vision of what people (the 
ideal citizens) do which can provide a basis for judging 
what people (real citizens) do. This action must be the 
essential action of free human beings living as they are 
intended to live. In this way, liberalism would function 
as a myth; it could provide a standard for judging how "one 
ought to behave."
A clue as to what the plot of the liberal narrative 
might be is provided by attribution of the character trait 
discussed above. If the ideal human being is a free and 
equal individual driven by economic and property concerns; 
it is reasonable to expect that the activities of these 
individuals would be those aimed at achieving their 
desires. And in fact, the importance of work in the nature 
of social reality was confirmed in the interviews. As a
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rule, work was defined narrowly to mean employment which 
leads directly to material rewards. For many, however, 
education was an important part of this activity.
Education functions to prepare one for employment in a 
field in which material gains are possible. Thus education 
is similar to the work involved in employment except that 
it is invested in future rewards rather than immediate 
ones.
if your work hard and get an education you will live 
and do fine
welfare would not be necessary if we could employ 
Americans in American jobs
...education which leads to good jobs
I would rather spend a little money on creating jobs 
than just give away money...(we need to) invest in 
training and education
so much social spending leads to a decline of the work 
ethic
Similar sentiments are echoed throughout the interviews. 
They provide brief glimpses into the belief that work is an 
essential activity of human beings.
The liberal story, then, is not one of heros and 
quests and returns, but one of equal human beings, driven 
by a desire to achieve some degree of material gain, 
working to achieve this end. Social and political 
interactions are then evaluated in terms of whether they 
promote or hinder this scenario. If the lack of education 
or government regulation interferes with this process, 
change is demanded. More evidence and a more complete
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description of this process will be presented in the second 
part of this chapter. For now, however, it does seem safe 
to conclude that the prevalence of discussions of people in 
general, economic matters, and the education/employment/ 
reward process is evidence of the narrative form of 
liberalism.
The fourth and final characteristic of myth to be 
discussed is its historical survival. The most telling 
evidence of this aspect of liberalism is the essential 
similarity between the view of human beings and social 
activity expressed by the participants in this survey and 
that expressed by Locke. The emphasis then and the 
emphasis now is on individuals acquiring property as 
opposed to an ideal of a social whole. Some of the 
economic conclusions drawn from these beliefs may have 
changed over the centuries, but the core narrative has 
survived in tact.
To this point, only one myth, liberalism has been 
described. The initial expectations, however, were that 
the inclusion of religious and black respondents would 
reveal the existence of other myths in American society. 
This expectation is not supported by the evidence. Many of 
the quotations offered above as evidence of liberalism are 
taken from black or religious respondents. Certainly this 
does not indicate that there are no other myths which are 
important in our society. Several of the black students,
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for example, indicated that the ideal of equality has not 
been accepted in the African-American community; a view of 
racial inferiority remains common. They explained how this 
condition remains as a hinderance to social and economic 
achievements by black Americans. As one respondent 
describes it, the stakes of challenging this view and 
failing are very high; such failure would leave one 
excluded from both worlds. But such beliefs are not held 
by black students at LSU. The same is probably true of 
religion; there may well be religious people who reject the 
isolation and materialistic aspects of liberalism, but none 
of these people were included in the sample for the present 
survey. Again, perhaps such people are not common in 
institutions of higher education. For most of the people 
who did identify themselves as members of a religion, 
Christianity in all cases, their religious views may have 
had an impact on one or two issue positions, but did not 
lead them to question the common liberal view of the 
workings of American politics and society.
The discussion of the liberal narrative, however, 
points out a peculiarity of this myth when compared with 
other myths. The narrative survives and functions without 
what might be called "common substance." In most myths the 
gods and heros, the goals of the quests and the trials 
therein, as well as the threats to the heros all have 
common names. The members of the society who know the myth
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know the names. Liberalism, on the other hand, might be 
described as a myth without names. It is a more vacuous 
form into which one places the names from personal 
experience. The hero may be Jack Kemp or Martin Luther 
King, the villain may be bureaucracy or racism, the guest 
may be prestige, power, or a fine home. Though all myths 
are stories related to real and empirical experience, 
liberalism derives it substance and names from real and 
personal experience.
The consequences of this peculiarity are several. For 
one the story may sound very different when told by 
different people. This makes it difficult for the analyst 
to recognize unless he or she looks for it specifically. 
This same transparency is true for people in general. All 
of the respondents recognize major problems in American 
society. Only one, and even this was only a slight hint, 
indicated that these problems might be a consequence of 
liberalism. Liberalism, as a rule, is not questioned, and 
it is not questioned, at least partially, because no one 
knows it is there. Ironically, this power of liberalism is 
still further indication of its myth status despite this 
vacuous or plastic quality.
At a more existential level as well, the peculiar 
nature of liberalism gives it peculiar power. In 
traditional societies, the myth actively ties the 
individual to other individuals. Despite the commonality
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of liberalism in American belief systems, this myth 
actively dis-integrates individuals from each other. 
Personal success is dependent on personal effort. Every 
respondent recognizes that the rewards of success are 
property and prestige, and the deserts of failure are 
embarrassment and poverty; these are the only two 
possibilities presented by the myth. For young 
respondents, therefore, tremendous time and energy are 
channeled into stacking the deck in one's favor. The 
contemplation of alternative visions of society is not a 
luxury they can afford. Thus their proposals for change 
call for increases in the purity of liberalism: welfare 
reform, less government, government should be run more like 
a business, etc.
Though the myth is certainly an important aspect, and 
perhaps the most important aspect, of the political belief 
system, most of the substance of political thought is 
somewhat less abstract. Though the elements of the liberal 
story are evident in the thoughts of the respondents; a 
great deal of mental effort invested in working out its 
subtle details is not evident. There is very little 
discussion, for example, of other human characteristics, or 
of exactly how much and what type of work are best.
Neither, however, is there evidence to support the 
proposition that political reasoning is dominated by policy
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details; the myriad of little decisions which are involved 
in policy formulation on issues like the economy, 
education, welfare, do not appear as elements of the 
reasoning process. And yet the respondents have very 
definite opinions on issues such as the economy, education, 
and welfare.
The purpose of this section is to explore the 
reasoning process as it exists between these two extremes. 
The main point to be made in this exploration is that the 
narrative form/process is an essential element of this 
middle-level political thinking. More specifically, the 
data from the interviews supports the idea of the heuristic 
as it is described by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) . 
Beyond simply reaffirming the importance of the heuristic, 
however, the function of both empirical experience and myth 
in the development of these stories can be portrayed. The 
information from the interviews reveals two common 
heuristics: one which might be labeled a social welfare 
heuristic and which is a somewhat more narrow variation of 
the desert heuristic, and a family heuristic. The chapter 
will conclude with commentary on rational coherence and 
mass belief systems.
Before presenting the two specific heuristics, the 
general process of heuristic formation should be specified. 
Heuristics appear to be the product of both real world 
experience and a myth, and the process is probably circular
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in a chicken and egg fashion. The discussion of it here 
begins arbitrarily with observations of the real world.
Such observations may be derived from a person's own 
experience or from information learned from others. The 
two examples to be discussed focus on the individual 
respondent's own experience. They comprise what might be 
referred to as the "facts" of the belief system. In some 
instances, respondents cited such facts as evidence in 
support of their opinions. This link, however, is not so 
direct. Facts in and of themselves are extremely 
incomplete and inadequate to producing a complete picture 
of the world or politics. Conclusions, therefore, require 
an interpretive framework. The framework is supplied by 
the myth. The heuristics which result are a consolidation 
of certain bits of information into clusters which are more 
narrow in scope than and subservient to the myth. The 
narrative form of these clusters is to be expected for 
reasons of integration and simplification as described in 
chapter three. These subnarratives are the principle 
components of normal, everyday, political evaluation.
The two examples of heuristic taken from the data 
collected in the interviews reveal the characteristics of 
the heuristic. Both of them indicate the importance of the 
liberal myth, the importance of experience, and the 
utilization of the heuristic in political evaluation.
There is also evidence, though the data is very limited, to
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support the idea that the elements of the heuristic are 
people and actions rather than abstract principles, thus 
supporting the idea of narrative form.
On social welfare issues, there are two general points 
of view. The first is nearly universal opposition to 
social welfare programs of the government. This position 
can be seen as a consequence of liberalism and experience.
Generally speaking, this opposition was expressed most 
adamantly by a subset of respondents whose life experiences
have been those of the upper-middle class; that is, the
group of people with almost no direct experience with such 
programs. As a rule the head of the household, usually 
their fathers, were doctors, executives, or other 
successful professionals. Despite this absence of 
experience, these respondents viewed these programs not 
only very negatively, but as very important factors in 
American politics. They commented that such programs 
destroyed "dignity," "the family;" and the "work ethic." 
They were fearful of the threat such programs were to their 
vision of their way of life. This comment is
representative: "my age group is at risk; providing for the
sick [AIDS patients], the old [increasing life expectancy], 
and the young [high birth rates among the poor]; how can it 
be done."
Such comments reveal not only the liberal myth but the 
respondents' own experience of "self sufficiency" which is
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generalized to all people: 1 if you work hard and get an
education you will do fine; if you choose not to, that's
your problem." In the language of the desert heuristic,
these respondents believe that need must be a product of
one's own choices, and consequently oppose responses by the 
government to this need.
Consider more closely the belief that government 
programs destroy "dignity." This conclusion may well be 
based on observations of the absence of dignity among those 
who benefit from such programs. Very telling, however, is 
the direction of the causal relationship in this story: 
payments destroy dignity. Why is the need for payments not 
explained as a result of the loss of dignity? An observed 
correlation between government support and personal dignity 
can be explained either way. The preference for the former 
is clearly a product of the liberal myth. The latter 
interpretation would require some recognition of systematic 
or structural factors which destroy dignity before the 
government gets involved. A liberal vision of society 
hinders the recognition of such factors. And the life 
experiences of this group of respondents confirm the 
importance of personal responsibility. To generalize from 
these observations; information, in this case the 
experience of economic independence, is received into a 
liberal interpretive framework, and a heuristic of 
government created dependency becomes the standard for
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judging welfare programs. The major elements of the 
heuristic discussed above are present: experience is 
interpreted within a myth which results in a description of 
social interaction, a story, which then becomes a standard 
for the evaluation of a set of policies.
Turning to the other major variation of the social 
welfare heuristic, respondents of lower socio-economic 
status, some of whom had personal experience with welfare 
programs, often recognized systematic or structural 
variables which contributed to the need for government aid. 
As mentioned, black respondents recognized that African- 
American society has not generally adopted the liberal 
myth. To the extent that these respondents recognized 
external causes of economic inequality and supported 
programs to overcome the disparities, they confirm the 
importance of the desert heuristic. The richness of the 
data from the interviews, however, reveals a more important 
distinction between the two groups. In addition to 
recognizing the need for welfare programs, the respondents 
with experience with such programs also recognized the 
problems with and limitations of them. Generally, these 
respondents did not see government payments as a long term 
or permanent solutions. Rather they, whether white or 
black, saw education at the heart of the problem and the 
solution. The cause of social inequality, however, was not 
the liberal vision of education described above, but
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systematic discrimination, particularly of blacks, out of 
this opportunity. The response of one white, future 
educator is representative, "In our system of education of 
the past twenty or thirty years, blacks have been 
systematically short changed." Black respondents describe 
this process in detail: "(in the schools I went to) blacks 
were placed in the lower sections where teachers were not 
teaching; this starts in kindergarten; one or two blacks 
are placed in the upper sections; all of the rest are moved 
to the side." The proposed solution in all of these cases 
was not a different kind of education, but greater 
inclusion of blacks within the system. Thus liberalism is 
again evident as the interpretive framework of information. 
The information is different for the two groups, but the 
standards of judgment to which reality is compared are 
developed from the same core narrative.
A second heuristic which is evident in the interviews 
portrays the role of the family in an otherwise individual 
oriented society. Most responses to questions about family 
values can be placed into one of two categories. Many 
respondents felt that this was an extremely important 
issue: "the degeneration of the family is the number one 
problem in America." This importance derives from a family 
heuristic which functions as a subnarrative of the liberal 
myth. In this heuristic, the family is the focal point of 
personal relationship and responsibility; it is an
exception to purely individualistic liberal autonomy. For 
these people, "traditional values of right and wrong" are 
dependent on "normal" family life. In this scenario, 
society can function as long as the family remains the 
"corner stone of the nation," and children learn 
traditional values of "hard work and pulling your own 
wait," or "if your honest with yourself you can be positive 
in your achievements." The break down of this source of 
values leads to "irresponsibility," "teenage pregnancy," 
"welfare," i.e., the liberal ideal is threatened: "(family 
values means) originally people to act in a Christian 
manner; stay married; politically exploited to mean family 
leave which is not legitimate; ...very important; morality 
of country is very important; teen age pregnancy comes back 
to morality which causes economic policy." Ironically, 
while the traditional family and its values are seen as 
essential to our survival, these respondents did not see 
that the larger society or its government had any role to 
play in its maintenance: "degeneration of the family is 
number one problem in American; don't know how politicians 
can change this; it begins in the home." "Parents teach 
(family values); cannot be legislated." This fact is 
further indication that a perception of the importance of 
family values is consistent with the general liberal myth.
Most respondents could be placed in this first 
category of responses to the family values question. A
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small group of interviewees, however, are clearly distinct. 
For these individuals, the issue was purely a political 
creation. (A couple of respondents fall somewhere in 
between these two extremes.) In two cases, the concept of 
traditional values, to say nothing of family, had been 
abandoned all together. For one self described 
libertarian, family values was a "smoke-screen" and 
"stupid." For another it was an effort to galvanize 
support of suburban whites with normal families against 
inner-city blacks without. Both of these respondents were 
very concerned that the economic and political spheres be 
left alone to operate freely.
Both of these general responses to the issue of 
families are consistent with the liberal myth. One 
variation depicts families and the values they teach as 
essential elements of a properly functioning liberal 
society; the other portrays such values as a hinderance to 
the same goal. The limited evidence also supports the 
suggested importance of personal experience in the 
development of the heuristic. All of the respondents in 
the first group grew up in very strong, usually religious, 
families. Those in the second group did not have this 
experience.
The description thus far of the policy evaluation process 
seems to indicate that there may be no relationship between
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a particular myth and particular policy conclusions. In 
the examples presented here, the same core narrative 
provides the foundation for contradictory conclusions. One 
might be tempted to conclude from this discussion that the 
myth on which the mass belief system is built has no policy 
consequences. As described above, policy opinions can be 
seen as consistent with the individual system history, but 
liberalism may lead to any number of policy positions on 
any given issue. To reach such a conclusion, however, is 
to fail to recognize liberalism for what it is: a shared 
myth which provides the interpretive framework not only for 
respondents but for analysts as well. A somewhat more 
objective view makes a different conclusion possible.
Rather than concluding that liberalism has no policy 
consequences, I would argue that liberalism is directly 
related to the policy questions. Answers to the questions 
may vary greatly, but the questions themselves arise from 
limitations of the myth. To illustrate this point, 
consider a few political questions which do not arise in 
the United States: Should there be a maximum limit on the 
amount of property one can posses? Should wealthy people 
who do not use their wealth responsibly have it taken away? 
Should church attendance be required? Should the United 
States exist as a nation? These questions are such 
profound violations of the liberal myth that they are non­
issues in our society. In other times and places, however,
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they could be, have been, and are the focus of intense 
political debate. It is also clear that in another time 
and place, with a different myth structure, abortion might 
never be considered, or the need to politically enforce a 
minimum standard of living never arise.
This conclusion is consistent with the theory 
presented in previous chapters. We know that any myth 
functions to simplify and make manageable the "absolutism 
of reality." It makes sense, then, that there would be 
limits to the experience which is encompassed by any 
individual myth. In other words, the explanatory power is 
limited and breaks down on certain questions. These may be 
the questions which politics in a society struggles to 
answer. Consider the abortion issue in our society. The 
origin of life is not described by the myth. From this 
perspective, it is not a surprise that this has become such 
a politically volatile issue and requires a purely 
political answer.
The interviews I have conducted reveal two striking 
characteristics of the respondents: their sameness and 
their uniqueness. For all of them, liberalism is the 
interpretive basis for translating their experience into 
heuristics; the process and its substantive foundation are 
the same. However, owing to tremendous variations in 
information and experience, political evaluations vary
greatly. Even people who come to the same conclusions may 
do so for different reasons. This situation is exactly 
that of self-organized systems: complexity generated by 
identical processes but produced by sensitivity to initial 
conditions and system history. Recall the observations of 
Krohn, Kuppers, and Nowotny (1990). "Complexity is 
recognized as a genuine phenomena that does not lend itself 
to being reduced to something simple or being explained by 
the 'overlapping' of simple elements (6). And, 
"irregularity of nature is not treated as an anomaly but 
becomes the focus of research and thus is declared to be 
normal. One looks for regularity within irregularity. 
Non-equilibrium processes are recognized as the source of 
order and the search for equilibrium is replaced by the 
dynamics of processes" (7).
Approaching belief systems from a narrative 
perspective has resulted in a recognition of rational 
coherence within the individual belief system. This 
coherence is not horizontal constraint between issues as 
has been expected in earlier studies, but historical 
constraint. Political beliefs are consistent with 
experience interpreted within a historical narrative. The 
existence of a sort of mass belief system is also apparent. 
Again it is different from earlier expectations, but the 
predominance of the liberal myth and its importance in
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generating the questions faced by our society would suggest 
that it is a foundation of a mass belief system.
The fundamental weakness of this analysis is an 
absence of variation at the level of myth between 
respondents and between respondents and the analyst.
Future research should try to overcome this limitation by 
using comparative analysis. Comparisons must be made 
across time and place. Such comparisons would help the 
analyst achieve some perspective on his or her own "mode of 
being in the world."
The data is also limited by the survey technique which 
was employed. Inquiring into the respondents views on a 
set list of issues interferes with the normal political 
reasoning process. This is an important limitation when 
the object of interest is the reasoning process itself. It 
is possible that fewer and more general questions would 
allow respondents to reveal in detail the narrative form of 
their reasoning and more richness in the heuristic.
CONCLUSION
If there is one central element which this 
dissertation adds to the belief system literature, it is a 
recognition of the importance of plot in political 
reasoning. Previous research had identified numerous 
important elements of the political evaluation process: 
persons, social groups, personal attributes, ideologies, 
memories. The connections between these elements, however, 
had remained so obscure that Bennett (1977) concluded that 
this body of research was in need of some rather radical 
rethinking. The incorporation of action, however, into an 
understanding of political reasoning creates a more 
congealed picture of this process.
The initial argument that plot may be an important 
element of political reasoning was based on the importance 
of social interaction in the heuristics described by 
Sniderman and his colleagues (1990). The form of these 
heuristics can be described as narrative. When combined 
with the findings of others that belief systems are 
hierarchical in structure, the possibility that plot is 
also an important element of reasoning at more abstract 
levels was suggested. As an initial examination of this 
thesis, the theoretical links between notions of myth and 
belief system were explored in chapter two. Substantial 
similarities were discovered. For example, myths are
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described as providing the image of reality which is used 
in evaluations of reality, and it is just such evaluations 
which are the basis of the individual political opinions 
which comprise the belief system.
The subsequent chapter approached the belief system 
literature form a different tack. Whereas the primary 
interest of chapter two was the nature of beliefs, chapter 
three questioned the nature of the system. Observations 
about belief systems were compared to general expectations 
of self-organized systems. Collectively, these 
observations provided substantial justification for 
conceptualizing belief systems as self-organized. For 
example, previous research has demonstrated both the 
importance of history in one's political opinions and the 
vast degree of irregularity which exists between people's 
belief systems. These are both characteristics of self­
organized systems as they have been described in other 
fields. This reconceptualization makes a shift in the 
focus of research efforts necessary. Efforts to understand 
self-organized systems are not directed toward making 
predictions about system response to the environment but on 
understanding the processes which enable it to maintain its 
organization and respond to challenges from the 
environment.
Again proceeding via a comparison of concepts, chapter 
three argued that a complex of processes related to the
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narrative form may be the organizational principle of self­
organized belief systems. The observation was made, for 
example, that stories are generally rationally coherent in 
that events can be seen as following from previous events, 
but they are not logically deterministic because any single 
event is not the only possible and necessary consequence of 
any previous one. This point demonstrates the conceptual 
compatibility of narrative and self-organization. Beyond 
this, it was also noted that political evaluation requires 
some cognitive process of simplification and that stories 
may well serve this purpose. Thus there is also reason to 
expect that stories are central elements of opinion 
formation.
At issue in chapter four was the importance of plot as 
it relates to previous theories of belief systems. Here 
the scope of the theory of myth based, self-organized 
belief systems was demonstrated. The indications were that 
it is not just another theory thrown into the quagmire of 
belief system literature (Bennett 1977; Kuklinski, Luskin, 
and Bolland 1991), but neither does it supplant previous 
theories. Rather just as myths integrate individual 
beliefs into a system and individual persons into a 
society, so does the theory of myth based belief systems 
integrate previous theories. For example, adding plot to 
the concept of schema provides a better understanding of 
the integration and evolution of schema.
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The exploration of concepts which was the focus of the 
dissertation through these first chapters resulted in a 
theory of belief systems with several strengths. One of 
the strengths of the theory of myth based belief systems is 
its parsimony. No longer is there a need to provide 
different explanatory schemes for different people. Though 
individuals do posses different degrees of information and 
intelligence, the underlying organizational process of the 
belief system is expected to be the same for everyone. A 
construct like "levels of conceptualization" does not 
indicate a qualitative difference in the nature of these 
processes as even the most sophisticated citizen does not 
approach full comprehension of the political universe. 
Everyone must organize pieces of knowledge into some whole; 
narratives make this possible regardless of intelligence or 
knowledge. Furthermore, the myth based theory of systems 
of belief is appropriate to all political questions. No 
longer is a theory of social group attachment required to 
explain racial policy, and a theory of religious values to 
explain positions on moral issues, and a theory of schema 
to explain the importance of memory in deciphering 
experience.
Despite the parsimony and power of the theory, this 
dissertation would have been incomplete without some 
exploration of these concepts as they are manifest in real 
people. Chapters five and six added this exploration. In
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general, the theory was supported by the data collected in 
the interviews, though some alteration was necessary.
Among the most important conclusions from this 
investigation were:
The importance of the heuristic in the reasoning 
process is affirmed. As a rule this is the level of 
abstraction at which most political thinking occurs. These 
are general perceptions of social interaction. They are 
more abstract than thoughts about individuals and policy 
details, but they are somewhat less abstract than an 
underlying•vision of the fundamental nature of human 
motivations and actions. Though the heuristic is distinct 
from these two levels, both are essential to its nature. A 
general heuristic may well be grounded in some specific 
details which provide evidence of its veracity, and these 
details are interpreted in the context of an underlying 
vision of the fundamental nature of human motivations and 
actions.
In reaching this conclusion, the dissertation has come 
full circle. The heuristic as set out in some of the most 
recent literature on belief systems was the point of 
departure for the suggestion that narrative may be an 
important aspect of political cognition. Then its 
importance was confirmed by both its theoretical 
implications, as have been explored here, and the data from 
the interviews.
A second conclusion consistent with both the theory 
and the data is that liberalism is accurately conceived of 
as a myth. In origin, form, process, and psychological and 
sociological function, liberalism meets the criteria set 
forth by most mythologists. It is true that the American 
myth is in some ways non-traditional. Its "nuclear unit," 
autonomous individual - initiation/work - reward, is quite 
different from the "nuclear unit of the monomyth," 
separation - initiation - return, described by Campbell 
(1968, 30-38). It is also the case that the autonomous 
individual remains a rather generic and nameless form. 
Nevertheless, liberalism is essentially a narrative which 
provides a simplified but coherent vision of human 
interaction which works as a foundation for interpretation 
of information and experience, and which by describing 
reality necessarily also describes deviance from reality 
and thereby functions as the source of prescriptions.
The fundamental importance of this myth, and the 
narrative form/process, within the individual belief system 
is also clear in the interviews. It is the primary goal of 
belief system research to explain rational coherence. The 
standard of rational coherence for the respondents is 
consistency with experience as interpreted within the 
liberal core narrative. Thus rational integration of the 
whole is far more dependent on personal history than on 
environmental sources of rational relationships.
156
In addition the theory extends beyond the individual. 
When properly understood, it is. meaningful to speak of a 
mass belief system. The mistake in the past has been to 
focus on patterns of policy positions as manifestations of 
such a phenomenon. The theory and the evidence presented 
here, however, suggest that a mass belief system lies below 
a policy opinion surface. In fact, the pervasiveness of 
liberalism indicates that it should certainly be conceived 
of as the foundation of a mass belief system. We have also 
seen that this foundation, though it does not lead to 
shared patterns of opinion, is directly responsible for the 
political questions with which our society must deal. Thus 
the mass belief system, unified by the liberal myth in this 
case, is the source of American politics; it is the source 
of the questions which must be answered politically.
As mentioned in the introduction, however, the theory 
leaves us with a host of fundamental research questions. 
Among these are the following.
Traditionally, public opinion research has made 
extensive use of statistical analytical techniques. Such 
methods are easily applied to close-ended survey responses. 
For a couple of reasons, however, such analysis is now 
expected to be problematic. Policy opinions, according to 
the theory proposed, are susceptible to numerous, 
interactive influences and therefore cannot be used as 
indications of deeper beliefs. As discussed in chapter
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four, an understanding of the context of an opinion is a 
necessary part of understanding the opinion itself. 
Questions like "what is at stake?" must be asked. In 
addition, such opinions are expected to be wildly 
irregular; indeed, chaotic. Techniques used in examination 
of other self-organized systems hold promise for belief 
system research, but issues of how best to apply them are 
also numerous.
As a beginning point for discussion on empirical 
issues surrounding the belief system described in this 
dissertation, the following might be considered. Surveys 
might focus on one or two issues. Instead of a single 
indicator on an issue, however, a question cluster might be 
developed. These questions would be aimed at providing 
context for the beliefs of interest. Such question 
clusters might include inquiries relating to various 
potential costs and benefits associated with issue 
alternatives. "An increase in income taxes leads to which 
of the following: better social services, greater equality 
in society, a worsened economy, more government waste, hard 
times for the middle class, more money available for 
scientific research, etc?" With enough forethought and 
perhaps pilot studies, clusters of valid, close-ended 
question might be possible. This would maintain the 
advantages of mass surveys but also provide richer data for 
deciphering the reasoning process. In addition to belief
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context, such question clusters could include experiential 
questions which are known to be important on the particular 
issue. If such data were collected over time, self- 
organizational statistical techniques could then be applied 
to the inter-relationships between the various indicators 
in the clusters. In this way the nature of challenge and 
response of systems of political belief in the environment 
could be described mathematically.
In addition to considering context and time factors in 
data collection, comparative analysis is also necessary in 
developing an understanding of the foundations of mass 
belief systems. Certainly no analyst will ever completely 
escape the influence his or her own myth has on perceptions 
of the world. However, comparative analysis may make 
elements of one myth more evident by placing them in 
contrast to another.
Other information, besides survey data, may also 
reveal aspects of the American political narrative web.
For example, issue evolution can be tracked through 
campaign rhetoric or legislative policy votes. Such 
analysis may reveal that issues arise at the points where a 
myth fails to provide answers, or that changes in the 
issues being discussed are related to changes in the 
foundation of the mass belief system.
As they stand here, all of the elements of the 
proposed theory are in need of a great deal more
159
exploration and explication. What variations exist in the 
basic liberal myth in American public opinion? Do some 
types of experiences have greater influence on belief 
systems than other types? What factors influence rigidity 
and flexibility of the myth and other narratives? What 
impact do information and cognitive ability have on the 
belief system? These and many other basic questions can be 
asked. They indicate that the theory of myth based belief 
systems remains a rough sketch. The interviews which were 
conducted filled in a few details, but the theory itself 
needs to be recognized as merely a single step in a process 
of clarification and discovery.
More generally, the theory raises questions about the 
nature of democratic politics. Surely the human equality 
element of liberalism has contributed greatly to the 
advance of democratic theory and practice. As noted in the 
analysis of the interviews, however, this common foundation 
for the political beliefs of Americans seems to be directly 
related to our most divisive disagreements. Furthermore, 
these disagreements are often unresolvable exactly because 
they are divergent conclusions stemming from the same myth. 
In such a situation, democracy becomes simply a political 
mechanism for reaching a decision. The majority has its 
way and potentially substantial minorities are left with no 
recourse. If democracy is to incorporate a philosophy in 
which all persons are seen as equal parts of something
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larger and whole, it must provide for working toward 
consensus.
One alternative would be to attempt to fashion a new 
myth which would provide a better foundation for democracy. 
Another possibility, and perhaps a more realistic one, is 
simply to recognize the myth qualities of liberalism. For 
the participants in the survey, liberal ideas seem to exist 
in the belief system as unquestioned assumptions. 
Respondents did not express a preference for this core 
narrative over others; they did not seem to recognize any 
others. As such, it was removed from debate. It was 
unquestioned, unchallenged, as therefore, rigid. This is 
perhaps an historical consequence of a fundamental belief 
in the value of democracy; as democracy is held in such 
high esteem, its foundations are held fixed. But it is 
this sacred and abstracted status of liberalism that leaves 
the nation unable to resolve fundamental political 
questions. In turn this produces the tremendously low 
feelings of efficacy which are evident in the respondents' 
discussions of democracy in America. The refusal to 
question liberalism may be detrimental to democracy.
By contrast, the recognition that liberalism is a myth 
leads to the realization that it is one story among many 
(Halpern 1961) . Furthermore, its limitations are realized. 
As a myth, liberalism is incomplete; it is an effort to 
deal with a reality that cannot fully be comprehended
(Blumenburg 1985). In its limitations, it is not relevant 
to or capable of providing answers to every political 
question. Consequently, if democracy is important, it 
requires not an unwillingness to question its philosophical 
and myth foundations, but a willingness to explore those 
foundations to discover their strengths and weaknesses.
Only this way can the myth respond to challenge and thereby 
evolve. Such evolution is essential to the survival of any 
myth (Blumenburg 1985; Campbell 1968) and may well be 
essential to the survival of democracy.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the theory of 
myth based belief systems is itself very much like a myth 
as described above. It provides an image of political 
reasoning which is internally coherent but incomplete. It 
can guide our search for and examination of facts, but is 
itself a way of looking at the facts. As such, it should 
not be considered a fixed entity, but a form/process.
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APPENDIX A 
BELIEF SYSTEM QUESTIONNAIRE
I. The Presidential Candidates
A. Did you vote in the presidential election in November of 
1992?
If NOT: Why not?
If YES: for whom?
B. Why did you vote for ____________ ?
C. What were your impressions of the other candidates?
D Why do you think Clinton won the election?
OR Did Bush loose the election?
II. Issues
A. I would like you now to take just a moment and imagine 
that you have been elected President of the United States:
1. What would be your top priority as president?
2. What do you think is the cause of this problem?
3. What would you do to solve it?
B. Other policy concerns you would have as President?
**I would like to ask you also about some other problems 
and issues which some Americans are concerned with**
C. Why do you think black Americans are generally worse off 
than white Americans?
D. In the last election, we heard quite a bit of discussion 
about family values.
What do you think that means?
How important is this to your own political beliefs? 
What are the threats to these values in our society?
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E. Do you think women in our country should play the same
roles as men or do the genders have different aspirations
and responsibilities?
F. Do you believe that everyone should be guaranteed a 
minimum standard of living?
G. What is your position on the abortion issue?
H. What is your position on the death penalty?
I. Any other issues which you feel strongly about which we 
have not yet discussed?
III. Government
A. Do you think the American Government is Democratic?
1. What does that mean to you?
B. Are some people's views better represented in our 
government than others?
IV. Personal
A. I would like you to give me a narrative account of your 
family history beginning with your grandparents and leading 
up to how you came to be a student at L.S.U.
B. What are your career plans?
Do you see any social obstacles to achieving your 
goals?
How will you overcome these?
C. Do you consider yourself a religious person?
Can you tell me about your participation and how your 
religion influences your political beliefs?
D. Are you between the ages of 18 and 25?
Race?
Gender?
**Thank you!
APPENDIX B 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
I am conducting this interview as part of my research 
for a Ph.D. in political science. My interest is in a 
general view of the relationship between political opinions 
and social experiences.
As I am interested in your political opinions 
generally, any one question is not that important. Just 
let me know if there is a question that you do not wish to 
answer for any reason. No explanation will be necessary, 
though if you find a question unfair or biased in any way,
I would like to know that.
I would also like to assure you that responses to the 
following questions will be completely confidential. When 
the interview is complete, your comments will be typed up 
without any reference to you personally.
Please do not feel constrained by the questions; 
simply discuss anything that comes in to your mind as you 
hear the question and are answering it. Also if you would 
like to take a moment to think about your response, feel 
free to do so.
Finally, some questions may sound repetitive; this is 
because I do not know how you are going to respond and not 
because I am trying to get you to respond a particular way. 
Do not feel that you need to make up new answers if you
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have already explained your position. Do you have any 
questions?
APPENDIX C 
EXPERIMENT CONSENT FORM
My signature on this form indicates that I have volunteered 
to participate in this experiment on political beliefs, 
conducted by Bryan Vincent on this ____ day of  , 1993.
I understand that all subjects in this project are 
volunteers, and that I can choose not to continue or 
participate at any point; that I have been informed as to 
the nature of this experiment; and that the information I 
provide will be anonymous and my identity will not be 
revealed. I also understand that the information I provide 
will be used for no other purposes beyond those explained 
to me today. Finally I reserve the right to ask any 
questions at any time during the experiment.
Subjects Signature
VITA
The present document brings to completion seven years
of graduate education in political science at Louisiana
State University which I began in 1986. My primary areas
of study have been American politics and political theory.
My work here has also included a minor in history. My
future research interests are to continue along the path of
this dissertation integrating traditional American
political thought and public opinion.
Prior to coming to LSU, I received a Bachelors of Arts
degree from Georgia State University in Atlanta. There I 
*
majored in English with a concentration in American 
literature.
I am currently employed by the Louisiana House of 
Representatives which I hope is an interim position until a 
teaching position becomes available. My position at the 
capital is staff analyst for the Health and Welfare and the 
Municipal, Parochial and Cultural Affairs Committees.
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